

## *Chapter Seven*

# **All Politics Is Local, 1946–1964**

### **THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES**

In this chapter, we discuss the tenure of the first five postwar Philippine presidents: Manuel Roxas, Elpidio Quirino, Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos Garcia, and Diosdado Macapagal. These presidents committed themselves to a national economic development plan based on close ties with the United States. Having encountered lower-class insurgencies in the past, they promised to “liberate” the peasantry from bondage but stopped short of destroying landlord power. Instead, they attempted to expand agricultural productivity through technological inputs, credits, and social welfare programs. Opening up the largest land frontier in Mindanao also provided a safety valve for the volatile countryside.

All five presidents adhered to the democratic rituals established in the Commonwealth era, despite occasional attempts to subvert the rules of the game. They were also practitioners of patronage, but were enjoined to steer the newly independent country toward full “modernization.” In the regional context of the Cold War—Communist victory in China, the politics of non-alignment in Southeast Asia, and expanding nationalist-Communist revolution in Indochina—they wanted to prove “American-style” democracy superior to its radical rivals. These pressures and the challenge of a domestic Communist rebellion demanded attention to effective governance. “Islands of state strength” began to appear inside the postcolonial Philippine state. At the same time, however, the institutional and social limits on state building became abundantly clear.

## The End of "Partyless Democracy"

Perhaps the most dramatic political change in the postcolonial period was the unraveling of Manuel Quezon's project of strengthening the presidency. It began almost as soon as the United States reaffirmed Filipino control of political and economic power. Although most former officials of the "Second Republic" were back in the political arena within a year or two, new actors were also set to join the game. These new "local strongmen" were without the landed wealth of the older generation; their power derived from education and professional talent, black market speculation, or arms and networks they acquired as guerrilla leaders during the war.<sup>1</sup>

Ferdinand Marcos (of Ilocos Norte) and Salipada Pendatun (of Cotabato) are illustrative cases. Marcos and Pendatun were son and protégé, respectively, of colonial officials; they both earned degrees at the prestigious University of the Philippines College of Law, made their mark as lawyers, and joined the war. After independence, with their private armies and wartime prestige, they launched political careers in the legislature. Ramon Magsaysay (of Zambales province) did not complete his college education, but wartime exploits became his passport to provincial governorship and eventually the presidency.

Private armies were essential to these strongmen, because postwar economic difficulties and the limited resources available as they were entering politics meant vicious competition with equally ambitious rivals. But coercion was not enough: The most successful strongmen rose by establishing electoral and patronage alliances with older elites, families who had amassed their wealth and earned their political spurs during the American period. Many rising politicians therefore sought alliances with sugar barons like the Lopez family of Negros Oriental to win election to Congress and even the presidency. Together the allies had the money, connections, and force necessary to deliver votes from northern Luzon to frontier Mindanao. In Congress and the executive office, the new leaders worked to defend and promote local interests against attempts within the state or by reformist social forces to shift power away from the provinces and the localities to the central state. Eventually overcoming their limited political experience and carving out their own niches, some would challenge and overpower their old patrons.<sup>2</sup>

After the formal grant of independence in 1946, these factions of the postwar elite created a republic that was in important ways the antithesis of the Commonwealth. It put Congress on an equal footing with the presidency, restrained executive agencies by retaining the legislature's power to approve the national budget, and kept the military on a tight leash via congressional appointment and promotion. Four interrelated changes enabled this reversal: the marginalization of Quezon's allies; the end of virtual one-party rule; the

expansion of the electorate by removal of the literacy qualification; and the subordination of state and party interests to the “scattered, particularistic” interests of political clans and family networks.<sup>3</sup>

The unraveling of state centralization began when those who shared the late president’s idea of “constitutional dictatorship” were eased from power. José P. Laurel and his allies in the Second Republic had always been disliked by the United States for their anticolonial nationalism; when they were tried as “Japanese collaborators,” the Americans remained cool, undermining their position within the Nacionalista party. Even President Sergio Osmeña (who had succeeded upon Quezon’s death) was politically weakened by wartime exile and General Douglas MacArthur’s patronage of other politicians. Moreover, in an attempt win popular support, Osmeña associated himself with the Democratic Alliance, a coalition of radical Nacionalistas and the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). This drove away landed elites, who feared Osmeña would revive and implement Quezon’s “Social Justice” program.<sup>4</sup>

The battle was first joined within the Nacionalista party over the issues of collaboration, distribution of war damage compensation, “back pay” for government employees, and peasant mobilization in response to violent attacks by the Philippine Constabulary and landlords’ private armies. Leading the assault on “old guard” centralizers was Manuel Roxas, a prewar senator and favorite of Quezon and MacArthur. Roxas was joined by provincial leaders who did not want the return of a powerful central state under Osmeña and by the new strongmen whose immediate concern was consolidating their provincial power. An intrusive central state was neither to their liking nor in their interest. The Nacionalistas eventually split; Roxas and his allies established the Liberal party, and the first postwar election became a hotly contested two-party battle. Roxas was endorsed by MacArthur and Quezon’s widow, thereby gaining a slight edge over the aging Osmeña, who was snubbed by the popular general. That Osmeña was defeated by a mere 203,000 votes suggests that many people still identified with the Nacionalistas and were suspicious of the new politicians.

Some observers welcomed the Liberal party victory as a “healthy development [that] tended to disperse the illusion of executive omnipotence.”<sup>5</sup> Campaigning was intense, as suffrage had been universalized and it was through the parties that votes were mobilized. Carl Landé explains the interdependence of votes, money, favors, and office:

Candidates for national offices need votes, which local leaders with their primary hold upon the loyalty of the rural electorate can deliver. Local leaders in turn need money to do favors for their followers, and this the candidate for high offices can supply. Local leaders also need a constant supply of public works

projects and services for their localities. Holders of high elective offices such as senators and congressmen . . . can affect the supply of projects and services.<sup>6</sup>

Block voting had been retained from the Commonwealth to ensure that voters were mobilized for the whole party slate, not for individual candidates. So although the parties were driven mainly by patronage, they also tried to project an identity—Nacionalistas as the party of Quezon, Liberals as the party of the new republic—especially in urban areas. For a brief period, the two-party system represented different interests and generations and competed for voters as organizations, not simply as loose associations dominated by individuals.

From the perspective of creating an effective central authority, however, the “healthy development” of two-party competition was a step backward. While some argue that, from the beginning, there was no fundamental programmatic difference between the parties, Nacionalistas who served with Quezon or in the Second Republic knew the value of a strong executive and the power of nationalism to motivate service to the common good. Claro M. Recto, Laurel, and Osmeña were still committed to centralizing the capacities of the state to strengthen the nation. The Liberals, in contrast, had little use for nationalism once the Philippines was independent. With Roxas’s election, power reverted almost entirely to their local bases. Henceforth, those who sought to use the presidency to govern would have to work through elaborate patronage networks of politicians whose main concern was strengthening their own power, not assisting in the construction of an effective national authority.

## **A Fragile Economy**

The impact of World War II on the Philippines was uneven: While most of the country was relatively untouched, Manila was devastated, and the success of communist guerrilla operations against the Japanese in provinces surrounding the capital profoundly altered their political makeup. Elsewhere, armed confrontation between Japanese and guerrilla forces had been minimal; the Japanese saw no reason to sustain the war effort in a country with less strategic value than Dutch Indonesia or British Malaya.

But the destruction of Manila, the displacement of landlord power in the adjoining provinces, and the disruption of plantation agriculture were enough to destabilize the new nation-state. The United States contributed to the problem when it demanded that the new government accept a “free trade” treaty heavily favoring the industrialized United States over the agrarian Philippines. The Bell Trade Act of 1946 accorded American entrepreneurs “parity” rights to land ownership, natural resource exploitation, and other business ac-

tivities. Not surprisingly, nationalist scholars and activists have condemned this trade agreement; Amando Doronila points out that “it started the post-war economy on the narrow base of agricultural primary products,” rather than encouraging industrialization or diversity of trade partners.<sup>7</sup> But criticism of its unequal provisions has come from liberal and conservative scholars as well. Economist Frank Golay, for example, wrote that the treaty included “a number of obnoxious infringements on Philippine sovereignty,” including U.S. control of Philippine monetary and exchange policy.<sup>8</sup>

The United States also pressured the Philippine government to sign a Military Bases Agreement (1946) giving the United States the right to maintain military bases in the country for ninety-nine years and American military advisers a major role in the development of the Philippine military. Approval of these treaties was the condition for the release of \$620 million in rehabilitation funds. Of this amount, \$400 million was allocated for property damage compensation and only \$120 million for the reconstruction of roads, highways, and harbors; the remaining \$100 million would come as surplus military property. Faced with desperate problems of wartime recovery, the Philippine Congress approved the treaties, although only after Roxas ousted from Congress seven Democratic Alliance representatives and three antitreaty Nacionalista senators on trumped-up charges of electoral fraud and terrorism. Because provisions of the Bell Trade Act contravened the Philippine Constitution, an amendment to the constitution was also passed and subjected to a national plebiscite. The electorate approved the amendment overwhelmingly, attesting to the continuing goodwill Filipinos felt for the United States.

Free trade and the disbursement of war-damage claims benefited only a small sector of the economy, mainly American-owned companies and Filipino exporters. Among those who drew cash from the rehabilitation funds were wealthy Filipino families with vast investments in land and commerce, some identified as collaborators with the Japanese or, in the case of one Spanish-Filipino tycoon, with European fascists. The landed elite—many were Roxas allies—profited from free trade as American market demand for primary commodities such as sugar, coconut oil, and hemp revived plantation production. And the sale of surplus military property simply became an opportunity for plunder. The Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, tasked to sell material worth 200 million pesos, turned over only 28 million pesos to the government after three years of operation. The rest was never accounted for.

Cronyism and the spoils system ensured that war funds were distributed to those closest to the regime. A vaguely defined American directive to release military “back pay” and related compensation to those who had not renounced their affiliation to USAFFE opened up a rich source of largesse to anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters—both genuine and fraudulent. (One of the

latter was the young Congressman Ferdinand Marcos, who submitted false claims that he led the guerrilla force “Maharlika.”) The Roxas government facilitated these payments because many of the claimants were affiliated with the new president and his Liberal party. Former Japanese collaborators—turned—Roxas supporters were also compensated for property damage; the regime assured the United States that speculation and hoarding of scarce goods during the war had fronted for supporting the guerrilla resistance. Worst of all, this money, which should have been invested in the production of goods and services needed for economic recovery, went largely toward the consumption of imported goods. (See box 7.1.)

The “unprecedented demand for imports” (over 1 billion pesos’ worth by the end of 1948), pervasive corruption, and rampant overpricing precipitated a balance-of-payments crisis that led to capital flight, inflation, and 15 percent unemployment in an active workforce of 7.4 million Filipinos.<sup>9</sup> By 1949, the

#### **Box 7.1. Consumerism, or the Dissipation of Foreign Reserves**

“A few representative items of the things we were starved for will suffice to remind everyone of the things that we have had to buy abroad, after conditions settled down a bit. Our working people were starved for the Piedmont cigarettes that they were smoking before the war; they were starved for the canned sardines and salmon and pineapple that they had come to like very much; and just to complete the picture, they were starved for just simple, plain good rice.

“Our middle class people were starved for the apples, grapes and oranges that were part of their daily diet before the war; they were starved for the Chesterfield and Lucky Strike cigarettes that they had missed for four years; they were starved for the five-tube and seven-tube radios with which they made life pleasant during the Commonwealth era; they were starved for the phonographs and phonograph records with which they enlivened many a dull evening during the time of peace.

“Our moneyed class were starved for the more expensive things. They were starved for the bacon and ham and Dutch butter which they had enjoyed on their tables before the war; they were starved for the limousines and sedans with which they cruised along Dewey Boulevard on warm evenings or on moonlight nights; they were starved for the grand pianos and the seven-cubic-foot refrigerators, for cabinet radio-phonographs, the woolen and Palm Beach clothes, the silk and linen dresses, the nylon stockings, and a hundred other luxuries that were part of their daily life before Pearl Harbor.

“Because of this profound and immense starvation, it was natural that as soon as money came into the hands of these different strata of people again, they began buying heavily all the things that they had been accustomed to, things that they needed and wanted, things that they enjoyed.”

—Secretary of Finance Pio Pedrosa (1950), quoted in  
Salvador P. Lopez, *Elpidio Quirino: The Judgement of History*  
(Manila: Elpidio Quirino Foundation, 1990), 83–84

economy was on the brink of collapse, with international reserves at a critically low \$260 million. By the end of the year, capital flight caused the reserves to decline by a further \$75.4 million.<sup>10</sup> Urban unemployment spurred organized labor, and the Communist-controlled Congress of Labor Organizations demanded increased support for the poor and criticized the continuing influence of American and landlord forces in government. In the rural areas, peasant groups protested Roxas's ties with the landed elite. Aggravating the situation was the government's failure to set its own house in order: By late 1949, the payment of military wages remained irregular and the entire educational system suffered from lack of funds.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, no effort was made to resolve the difficulties of tax collection. The United States now recommended the adoption of direct taxation—the very reform it had shied away from when the responsible power—but the Roxas administration declined as well, lest it alienate its business and landlord allies and their representatives in Congress.

In April 1948, Roxas died suddenly of a heart attack, spreading fear that the Republic was on the brink of collapse; his vice president and successor, Elpidio Quirino, was seen as lacking the ability to deal with the economic crisis. Luckily for Quirino, U.S. president Harry S. Truman and his advisers were persuaded that free trade between two countries with unequal economic capacities would not promote Philippine economic development. Alarmed by the victory of Communist forces in China and the radicalization of Filipino peasants, they needed to arrest the Philippines' decline. With the approval of the U.S. president, the Philippine government implemented a series of "import and exchange controls" to stem capital drain.<sup>12</sup> But what was approved by the United States as an emergency measure presented an opportunity for Philippine economic planners to begin import substitution development.<sup>13</sup> Their goal was to stimulate industrial production by limiting imports and allowing local industry to grow in a protected market. To prevent unauthorized imports, the Central Bank controlled the country's dollar reserves and determined access to them. Industries that needed to import raw materials or capital inputs to produce for the domestic market had priority in dollar allocation. Firms seeking to import finished consumer goods qualified last or not at all. The United States promised \$250 million in loans and credits and sent advisers to help in critical areas such as economic planning. This commitment came at a crucial time, for President Quirino's government faced a serious popular challenge in the PKP-led Huk uprising.

### **The Huk Rebellion**

PKP rhetoric was radical and mimicked political calls emanating from Stalinist Russia, but Filipino Communists were actually inclined initially toward

“legal struggle,” that is, the mobilization of urban workers and peasants along constitutional lines. This reality did not prevent state authorities from attacking the party. As fervent anticommunists, government officials had always believed the PKP’s real agenda was to seize state power. Quezon had harassed and imprisoned PKP leaders in the 1930s until the war led to a “popular front” against Japanese aggression. During the war, the PKP-led Hukbalahap distinguished itself as an effective guerrilla army, much like its Communist counterparts in Vietnam and China. But it did more: In areas north of Manila, after landed elites fled to the cities, the Hukbalahap became the *de facto* state and gave peasants a taste of local power. This brief experience with “popular democracy” did not escape the notice of the United States, whose anticommunism dovetailed with elites’ efforts to recover power and control over the countryside.

State harassment and landlord reprisals increased popular resentment, and violence escalated between Hukbalahap units and private armies supported by the Philippine Constabulary and local police. Hukbalahap leaders tried to negotiate with the Americans, but their anti-Japanese achievements in the war had become irrelevant as anticommunism became the new U.S. priority. As a Communist-led organization, the Huks (pronounced HOOKS)—as they were popularly called—were now the enemy. At the same time, Roxas’s exclusion of the PKP from constitutional politics forced its leaders to explore alternatives. When negotiations with President Quirino failed, the PKP decided on armed struggle. The anti-Japanese army was renamed the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People’s Liberation Army, or HMB), and a series of counter-offensives was launched against the government. By 1950, rumors circulated in Manila social circles that the Huks were just months away from capturing Malacañang, the presidential palace. (See box 7.2.)

The PKP leadership may have believed this, too—but it was wrong. The party overestimated both its own strength and the commitment of its peasant base. Its leaders assumed that experience under the Japanese, followed by government and landlord assaults after the war, had sufficiently radicalized the peasants. It turned out, however, that peasants had different notions about “socialism” and that their pragmatic “economistic” interests clashed with the PKP’s ideologically “proletarian” perspective. Peasant support for the armed resistance was not resilient because it was not founded on a consistent belief in armed struggle to seize state power. Many joined the HMB to defend themselves from military reprisals, while others simply hoped to shock the government into implementing land reform. Moreover, PKP leaders failed to refine military coordination between the armed struggle in the countryside and the labor movement in the cities.<sup>14</sup>

**Box 7.2. Causes of the Huk Rebellion**

“Last Sunday, through the medium of a Sunday pictorial magazine, the starving four million in this country were shown how the four hundred make merry.

“As I thumbed through the pages, noting the glitter and the lavishness of the two parties pictured, my mind went to the masses who invariably go hungry when crops fail or their fields are converted into battlefields; to the thousands who are unemployed; the millions who live in filth and squalor in ramshackle houses; the thousands who get sick and die for lack of medical attention.

“Given for one night only, such birthday parties as pictured in the magazine could, I surmise, feed the population of a barrio for a whole week.

“Of course, the rich and the powerful can claim they have a right to dispose of their money any way they see fit. But the trouble is they are not content with merely giving lavish parties; they also have to advertise the fact. Their enjoyment doesn’t seem complete unless the whole country learns of their gay and reckless spending.

“Usually, these party-givers are the same people who bewail the lack of peace and order in the country. They don’t understand why there are strikes and why the peasants take up arms in an effort to improve their lot.”

—Armando J. Malay, *Manila Chronicle*, May 31, 1949

Meanwhile, American intervention led to major changes in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Taking direct control of counterinsurgency operations, American officials and the Central Intelligence Agency (led by the infamous operative Edward Lansdale) used the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) to introduce changes in AFP military organization and make it an effective counterinsurgency force. Improved training, better equipment, and military aid boosted morale and fighting performance. Public perception of the AFP changed for the better, too, when it captured the top members of the PKP Politburo.

To these two generally cited factors for the failure of the Huk rebellion, we should add the importance of migration to escape poverty and oppressive tenancy arrangements. In the first fifteen years of the postwar period, Filipinos from the densely populated northern and central islands moved in massive numbers to the southern “frontier” of Mindanao. The migration of more than a million people by 1960 was largely spontaneous and had little government support, but was surprisingly well organized and did not produce the volatility that often accompanies mass migration.<sup>15</sup> Utilizing family and village networks, migrants from Cebu and Bohol provinces in the Central Visayas and some Pampangos from central Luzon moved steadily into northern and eastern Mindanao. Migrants from northern Luzon settled in western Mindanao and those from Western Visayas settled in the southern



Figure 7.1. President Quirino (right, gesturing) displaying captured Huk leader Luis Taruc to the media (courtesy of the Lopez Memorial Museum, Philippines)

province of Cotabato. Migration resulted in more complex political networks reaching across geographical areas. Visayan or Ilocano politicians, for example, could no longer rely on their traditional “bailiwicks” alone and had to establish links with Visayan and Ilocano communities in the frontier zones. By the 1950s, northern and eastern Mindanao were already among the top ten vote-rich provinces of the country.

The wholesale migration of communities from Huk-influenced areas such as Pampanga and Bulacan indirectly aided government efforts to deprive guerrilla “fish” of their peasant “water.” By easing pressure and stabilizing politically explosive regions, migration postponed class conflict for at least a generation. It was a phenomenon the AFP and CIA immediately appreciated, prompting them to add organized resettlement of surrendered Huk supporters and sympathizers to the counterinsurgency program. The Economic Development Corporation (EDCOR) project, which settled ex-Huks in Lanao del Sur and Cotabato, became a powerful propaganda tool of the state—it advertised an alternative to rebellion, the chance to own a piece of land, and a way out of poverty. With the surrender of leading HMB commanders by the middle of Quirino’s term, the Huk rebellion ended.<sup>16</sup>

## The Weak State

The Huks had been seen as a grave threat in part because the state was seen as completely ineffective under Roxas and Quirino. Corruption that began in the Roxas period reached serious proportions during the Quirino presidency. He himself was charged with extending favors to relatives and allies, with profligacy (for example, ownership of a golden chamber pot), and with tolerating corruption in Congress. (See box 7.3.)

Yet there was evidence of professional governance as well. The National Economic Council and the Budget Commission were “powerful tools to determine the course of economic development” under the new import substitution policy.<sup>17</sup> The Central Bank, which tightly supervised import licenses and American dollar allocation, helped stabilize the economy and created opportunities for domestic industries to grow; with American support, it withstood pressure from powerful sugar barons to gain unlimited access to the country’s dollar reserves.<sup>18</sup> At the critical juncture when import controls needed to be implemented and defended, the bank’s professional staff performed well.

### **Box 7.3. Corruption**

#### **Senate President Jose Avelino, upon learning that President Quirino had approved an investigation into Avelino’s alleged corruption, 1950**

“Why did you have to order an investigation, honorable Mr. President? If you cannot permit abuses, you must at least tolerate them. What are we in power for? We are not hypocrites. Why should we pretend to be saints when in reality we are not? We are not angels. And besides, when we die we all go to hell. Anyway, it is preferable to go to hell where there are no investigations, no Secretary of Justice, no Secretary of Interior, to go after us.”

#### **President Garcia’s executive secretary, Juan Pajo, 1958**

“I was playing golf at Malacañang Park on the other side of the Pasig River across from the Palace. [A businessman] had come to see me about the approval of a barter license. I was new in my office then and I recommended that it be approved because in my opinion it was perfectly legal. As soon as the baggage compartment was opened, he pointed to a pile of paper bills amounting, according to him, to P50,000. ‘That’s for you,’ the man said, ‘for having recommended the approval of my firm’s barter license.’ The man was about to lift the box containing the money when I told him not to bother moving it because I was not interested in any part of his P50,000. When he realized that I meant what I said, he became apologetic. He must have been very embarrassed because he left in a hurry.”

Lewis E. Gleeck Jr., *The Third Philippine Republic, 1946–1972* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1993), 226–27

The import and exchange controls laid the foundation for a “viable manufacturing sector” that reduced economic dependence on imports. By the end of Quirino’s term in 1954, the manufacture of goods for local consumption had expanded dramatically. Postwar Japanese reconstruction and the Korean War also stimulated a rise in exports, and Philippine products from timber to sugar to coconuts enjoyed favorable prices on the international market. Temporary cessation of legislative–executive battles allowed some new tax measures to pass, including higher corporate tax rates, which increased government revenues. When Quirino became president in 1948, annual tax revenue was 329 million pesos. By the end of his term, it had increased to 655 million pesos, leading to the first budget surplus since 1946.

There were limits to the efficacy of state reform, however. The government continued to resist American pressure to implement direct taxation, so the tax system remained regressive—heavily skewed against the middle class and poor, who paid a higher proportion of their income through indirect consumption taxes. Moreover, although domestic capitalism was strengthened and Americans complained about the Filipinos’ “unfair advantage,” U.S. firms actually benefited from the currency and import regime. Their subsidiaries—legally registered Philippine corporations or joint ventures with Filipino business partners—qualified for dollar allocation to import raw materials or semifinished products from the parent corporation. Others put up “packaging and assembly plants” in the Philippines, ostensibly to service the domestic market but essentially to qualify as dollar importers.<sup>19</sup>

Executive initiatives were also costly in terms of new opportunities for graft and corruption. The import and currency regime led to the emergence of “new cronies,” businessmen whose close ties to state officials gave them easy access to dollar allocation and import privileges. A popular phrase of the day was “ten percenter”—an official who demanded 10 percent from importers and businessmen who sought a license to open an import substitution business. Quirino’s success in stabilizing the economy was thus overshadowed by tales of corruption and “well-publicized large scale postwar scandals in the body politic,” including some involving his own family.<sup>20</sup> Journalist Amando Doronila described the Quirino era as “represent[ing] the lowest ebb of central authority in relation to centrifugal forces and the autonomy of the State in relation to domestic forces seeking to influence public policy.”<sup>21</sup> This image stuck with Quirino throughout his term, and when he ran for reelection in 1953, he was soundly beaten by his former defense secretary, Ramon Magsaysay.

## REFORMING THE STATE THROUGH ELECTORAL POLITICS

### “My Guy Magsaysay”

Magsaysay’s candidacy was backed by professional military officers, the CIA, the Catholic Church, professional associations, and anticommunist labor and peasant associations, which formed the Magsaysay-for-President Movement, a well-oiled propaganda machine that promoted his image as a nontraditional politician. These forces also set up the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), an election watchdog that organized teams to guard against fraud and ensure fair vote counting. Magsaysay’s image as a reformist dovetailed with middle-class anticommunism and the desire for stable, “clean and honest government” after the turbulent Roxas and Quirino eras. Magsaysay’s background also enraptured the popular imagination—a mechanic, he was the first national leader from a provincial lower-class family and the first nonlawyer to aspire for the presidency. Finally, the AFP’s successful counterinsurgency campaigns, which came under his watch as defense chief, enhanced his stature as a competent leader. The CIA and his supporters in the national and international media packaged these political assets to create the image of Magsaysay as a “man of the people.” Quirino, tarred with corruption charges and portrayed as the quintessential traditional politician, was no match for Magsaysay.

In his first year in office, Magsaysay vigorously pursued reform. Personal popularity, American support, and majority control in both houses of Congress enabled him to pass: Republic Act 997, which increased the powers of the executive office; a law to improve management of the state budget; and a five-year national economic development plan to generate 1.7 million jobs. He recruited business executives to oversee economic projects and bolster the image of a professional, apolitical executive branch. Magsaysay also tapped the military for projects outside its normally authorized sphere of activities. AFP units played an active role in “civic action programs” to improve rural livelihoods and thwart Communist recruiters. Officers also ran certain executive offices, such as the Bureau of Customs and the Mindanao resettlement programs. This broke the enshrined tradition separating military from civilian work and used the army internally for the first time. But little opposition was heard from Congress or the media as long as the AFP was identified with its popular ex-boss and still basking in national and international commendation for its successful counterinsurgency war.

Magsaysay created another precedent with his effort to reach directly to rural communities through the Presidential Assistant for Community Development (PACD), an office that delivered government assistance to farmers. The



**Figure 7.2. Ramon Magsaysay (in civilian clothing): A Cold War president who enjoyed strong U.S. military support (courtesy of the Lopez Memorial Museum, Philippines)**

PACD was backed by a series of smaller, specialized presidential agencies that provided agricultural extension services to improve farmers' productivity and access to markets. Operating alongside these agencies were groups like the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) and the Philippine Rural Improvement Society (PRIS), the first nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the Philippines, set up by Magsaysay's private-sector supporters. American officials gave their full support to these projects by providing the PACD with start-up capital of \$4.2 million and promising an additional \$42.5 million to keep the program going.<sup>22</sup>

Magsaysay's network of presidential agencies and NGOs had not only economic objectives but also the political aim of popular mobilization independent of local "political bosses" and landed elites. Agencies like the PACD functioned as instruments for the executive branch to bypass local strongmen and deal directly with rural constituents. PACD's seven-thousand-strong workforce functioned as both "community development workers" and political officers promoting rural popular democracy. Magsaysay, who understood what dependence on patronage politics and backroom deals in Manila could do to a president, saw the PACD, its subsidiary agencies, its NGOs, and its American supporters as vital to setting up an electoral base independent of his party and its patronage network.

Francis Starnes was correct to observe that Magsaysay's presidency signified the "gradual breaking down of the semiautonomous centers of local power, and a reorientation of these areas in the direction of the national government."<sup>23</sup> This was not new, but rather the return of a political habit last seen in the Commonwealth period—the "excessive personalization of the functions of the presidency."<sup>24</sup> Like Manuel Quezon, Magsaysay used his popularity to make administrative changes aimed at strengthening the central state *as well as* his own stature as leader. Yet he was different from his colonial predecessor in that he mobilized social forces directly. This set a precedent for future presidents who wanted to establish a direct link with the people. It was the first postwar image of Filipino populism.

In terms of strengthening the state, however, the personalized presidency has certain disadvantages. No matter how effective the presidential agencies may have been, their association with Magsaysay *personally* detracted from their ongoing value *institutionally* as instruments of executive power. Such initiatives tended to have useful lives coinciding with the term of their creator, although they lived on as sources of jobs and patronage, waiting to be reactivated. Second, the personalized and increasingly powerful presidency eventually stirred a congressional backlash. Magsaysay's use of the army, for example, did not directly threaten legislators, who still controlled military appointments and promotions, but it angered their local networks. Wherever the

AFP operated, it sidelined and overruled the local police, the instrument of social control wielded by local bosses and landlords. Their displeasure rather quickly found its way into the halls of Congress. When Magsaysay tried to pass the Land Reform Act of 1955, he exempted the huge estates of the sugar barons, and the legislature further weakened the act with amendments making it difficult for tenants to actually acquire land. Shortsighted American policy makers offered no help on this score. Sensing that the Communists had been thoroughly defeated, they eased their pressure on politicians to pursue land reform and recalled American advisers who proposed more radical measures for comprehensive land distribution.<sup>25</sup>

Before these problems had a chance to affect his popularity, Magsaysay was killed in a plane crash in May 1957. His vice president, Carlos P. Garcia, completed his term and then won his own presidential term.

### **A Patchwork State**

Garcia lacked Magsaysay's charisma and was more at home with patronage politics than with Magsaysay's reformist allies. When the latter tried to challenge Garcia in 1957 by forming a third party, he relied on the Nacionalista party machine to defeat them. But Garcia was no Quirino—he was an “old line Nacionalista,” admirer of Quezon, and legatee of the nationalism of José Laurel and Claro Recto. Having witnessed the impact of free trade and the dominant role of American economic interests in the postwar period, Garcia saw import controls as an opportunity to assert a Filipino presence in, if not control over, the economy—an issue important to his mentors Laurel and Recto as well. He therefore anchored his presidency in his “Filipino First” policy, the active promotion of the “Filipino business establishment.” The policy drew protests from American, Chinese, and Chinese-Filipino business interests. The Chinese in particular regarded the policy's narrow interpretation of “Filipino” as a discriminatory ruse to eject them—as “aliens”—from the retail trade. The program was well received, of course, by their Filipino counterparts, who saw a chance to increase their share of dollar allocations under the import and currency control program.

Since the imposition of import controls, the economy had experienced 40.8 percent growth in manufacturing, 17.2 percent growth in agriculture, and 34.5 percent growth in mineral exploitation. Under Garcia's Filipino First policy, domestic industries numbered about five thousand in 1960; the Filipino share of new investments rose to 88 percent. It was now possible to talk of the Philippines having a “modest industrial base” and a more diversified economic elite.<sup>26</sup> Domestic consumer goods production and secondary industries (for example, cement and machine parts) increased the urban work

force and led to the dramatic expansion of urban centers, especially Manila and Cebu.

On the other hand, economic growth failed to improve social equity. Income distribution remained heavily skewed in favor of the rich. In 1957, the top 20 percent of Filipino families received 55 percent of total income while the lowest 20 percent received only 4.5 percent.<sup>27</sup> The middle class remained stable but failed to grow. Lower-class antagonism was kept in check only by the virtual disappearance of the radical Left, the moderating influence of reformist peasant and urban associations, and the continuing availability of land in Mindanao. The government, and the Catholic Church hierarchy that shared its anticommunism, headed off potential linkages between disgruntled lower classes and politicized intelligentsia through a systematic anticommunist inoculation campaign in schools and churches.<sup>28</sup>

If the Filipino First policy essentially benefited the elite, it also became contaminated by the spoils systems. Garcia's reliance on the Nacionalista machine and the support of local warlords and strongmen gave "business buccaneers" close to the president license to engage in "primitive accumulation." State corporations, such as the National Development Corporation, became havens of corruption, bribery, fraudulent transactions, and favoritism. Businesses which supported and subsidized Nacionalista political leaders were rewarded with easy access to dollar allocations and credits, import privileges, tax exemptions, and, if they faced bankruptcy, government bailouts. Garcia himself candidly admitted that when it came to cronyism, his presidency had become "a ship that has gathered a lot of barnacles along the way; I cannot shake them off. . . . [T]his was during the time of controls, when it was so easy to make anybody a millionaire; just give him a license and it's done."<sup>29</sup> By the end of his second year in office, Filipinos saw no difference between Garcia and Quirino in terms of corruption.

Again, the picture was not wholly grim. Certain agencies were able to maintain their autonomy from patronage interests. Under Miguel Cuaderno's leadership, for example, the Central Bank and Monetary Board fought a rear-guard action to limit attempts by rent-seekers and others to eliminate import controls (see box 7.4). Cuaderno was able to rein in government spending, including attempts by Garcia himself to waste dollar reserves. As the *Philippine Free Press* reported:

When the President got funny ideas on how to spend government money extravagantly for political purposes, Cuaderno put his foot down. When the politicians . . . bloated the national budget, Cuaderno . . . wielded the axe and cut the budget down to size. The Central Bank in Cuaderno's time imposed not just monetary but also fiscal discipline on the government.<sup>30</sup>

**Box 7.4. An Island of State Strength**

“Because of the widespread opposition to Central Bank Circular No. 79, which provided for additional restrictions on bank credit, President Garcia called a joint meeting of the Cabinet and members of the Monetary Board on board the Presidential yacht ‘Sta. Maria’ one evening.

“When I noticed that the purpose of the joint meeting was for the Cabinet to consider the wisdom of the issuance of said circular, I was constrained to perform the very delicate duty of explaining that the credit regulations adopted by the Monetary Board were not subject to review by the Cabinet. When one of the Cabinet members expressed doubt as to the validity of my statement for the reason that the members of the Monetary Board were Presidential appointees, I was compelled to explain that it was precisely the intention of Congress to give this body as much freedom of action as possible that the Charter of the Central Bank gave the majority of its members fixed terms of office.

“I felt that the remarks did not please the President and some members of the Cabinet, but it would be most unfortunate if any action taken by the Monetary Board in the discharge of its responsibility with respect to the maintenance of monetary stability could be reversed by the Cabinet. Since action of the Monetary Board in this connection is usually unpopular and politically unpalatable, central bank legislation since the advent of the managed currency system has tended to free the monetary authorities from extraneous control.”

—Miguel Cuaderno Sr., *Problems of Economic Development: The Philippines, a Case Study* (Manila: Miguel Cuaderno Sr., 1964), 57–58

The mixture of plunder and professionalism made the state look like a quilt: Small patches of good governance adjoined larger patches of corruption and inefficiency. Unfortunately, as in the Quirino period, the latter overwhelmed the “islands of state strength.” Scandals piled up—malversation of funds allotted to the National Marketing Corporation, favoritism in the disbursement of Japanese reparation funds, the privatization of public lands, the private use of government retirement accounts.<sup>31</sup>

With each exposé, Garcia’s hold on power became more vulnerable. American, Chinese, and Chinese-Filipino businesses discriminated against by the Filipino First policy became more vocal. They were joined by Filipino commodity exporters who wanted to end tariff and currency controls and by middle-class associations dismayed by the return of “old corruption.” These social forces were augmented by American businessmen, who had always regarded Filipino First as a ruse to introduce socialist-type economic programs and links with suspect regimes like Sukarno’s Indonesia. Senior AFP officers, who had been marginalized by Garcia after running executive agencies under Magsaysay, began to plot a coup against the president—the first time Filipino military officers contemplated such a move. While it was nipped in the bud,

the rumors alone destabilized Garcia's administration.<sup>32</sup> Meanwhile, opponents in Congress initiated impeachment proceedings.

Garcia ran for reelection in 1961, but was soundly defeated by his Liberal party rival, Diosdado Macapagal, who promised to open the economy to world trade, welcome back foreign investment, and improve state capacities to play a more meaningful role in economic development.

### **National Development**

Macapagal was the first president to attempt national development planning. He established the Program Implementation Agency (PIA), an executive body charged with creating and implementing a comprehensive national economic development plan. The PIA was also meant to balance the National Economic Council, which under Garcia had ceased to function as an executive planning body as it fell under the control of politicians.<sup>33</sup> Macapagal insulated the PIA from "particularistic interests" by ensuring that its senior staff was apolitical and not easily swayed. He found able candidates for the job among a team of American-trained technocrats who shared his vision of an open economy, were rich enough not to be tempted by wealth, and were well liked by international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

The PIA was instrumental in implementing currency decontrol beginning in 1962, and agricultural exports received a temporary boost from the peso's devaluation. But the accompanying protective tariffs meant that the country still lacked a coherent development policy. The main beneficiaries of this situation were the family-owned conglomerates that were diversifying into new exports and industries. With "loyalties to family . . . stronger than to any single economic sector," these families needed access to "particularistic favors" more than they needed coherent policy.<sup>34</sup> However, they were now threatened by Macapagal's promise to go after "tax evaders" and "corrupt businessmen." He especially targeted the Lopez family—one of the country's richest, with interests in sugar, media, and power utilities. The battle fizzled as the Lopezes used their extensive patronage network in Congress to deflect Macapagal's attacks. Congress accused the president of "dictatorial tendencies" and refused to support his projects. Of the twenty-six "socioeconomic" bills Macapagal sent to Congress, only three became law. A land reform bill did pass, but it hardly resembled the original after the addition of more than two hundred amendments, including the exemption of lands devoted to real estate and the elimination of a tax to finance the reform.

Timely media exposés of government corruption sealed the fate of Macapagal's reform efforts. Stories of "conspicuous consumption" amid unremitting poverty, presidential vindictiveness toward enemies, policy implementation

derailed by petty conflict, and growing nepotism undermined his presidency. Macapagal was forced to back down from his legislative agenda. His defeat soon brought to light other compromises. These included arrangements with certain senators not to disrupt their smuggling operations in exchange for votes, and “sweetheart deals” with American agricultural interests to rent public lands at bargain prices for banana and pineapple production. Most devastating was his dismissal of justice secretary Jose W. Diokno, whose investigation of illegal dealings between politicians and American businessman Harry Stonehill was heading dangerously close to the president’s inner circle. The firing of Diokno was described by the *Philippine Free Press* as a “major setback in the administration’s crusade against graft and corruption.”<sup>35</sup>

Macapagal ended his term like Garcia—known more for the corruption permeating his administration than for his attempt to coordinate economic development. His rival in the 1965 presidential election, Ferdinand Marcos, pledged to do better in modernizing the country.

## POSTWAR NATIONALISM

Debates over Filipino nationhood changed with independence. First, they shifted from dissatisfaction with American rule to criticism of military, economic, and cultural “neo-colonialism,” as manifested in U.S. military bases, lopsided economic agreements, and the “Americanization” of Filipino culture and consciousness.<sup>36</sup> This postwar nationalist critique was articulated first by the PKP and upon its defeat was picked up by nationalists such as senators Laurel and Recto.<sup>37</sup> These politicians became the ideological spokesmen of the “nationalist business class” that supported Garcia’s Filipino First policy and the inspiration for a small but vocal group of students at the University of the Philippines and the Laurel family–owned Lyceum College. Working together, the nationalist social forces achieved certain changes in Philippine–American relations, including a law limiting “alien” ownership and involvement in the economy and the renegotiation of the tenure of the military bases.<sup>38</sup>

The nationalists did not go unchallenged. Conservative social forces in government, the church, the media, and universities launched an aggressive campaign to silence the students, associate Recto’s nationalism with communism, and expose corruption within the “nationalist class.” The conservative counteroffensive worked against the politicians, but it failed to stamp out the nationalist resurgence on the campuses, which called for the Filipinization of private school curricula and staff and the teaching of José Rizal’s novels (see box 7.5). By the early 1960s, nationalists at the University of the Philippines had survived McCarthy-style Communist witch-hunts, emerging stronger and

better organized. In 1962, a group called the Student Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines drew national attention with its criticism of the Vietnam War and defense of the university's tradition of autonomy, now under attack by conservatives. Its leader was a young lecturer named Jose Maria Sison, who would go on to "reestablish" the Communist Party of the Philippines.<sup>39</sup>

**Box 7.5. Claro M. Recto, the Catholic Hierarchy, and the Rizal Law**

"During the 1955 [senatorial] campaign, Recto was the target of a well-organized opposition by members of the Catholic hierarchy and its many organizations. They charged him with being a communist and an anti-Catholic. . . .

"Church displeasure with Recto increased during the controversy over the Rizal bill. He was the original author of the proposal to make Rizal's *Noli Me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo* compulsory reading in all universities and colleges. . . . The measure immediately ran into determined opposition from the Catholic hierarchy. . . . Their argument was that the bill would violate the freedom of conscience and religion. The Catholic hierarchy even issued a pastoral letter detailing its objections to the bill and enjoining Catholics to oppose it. . . .

"A more organized campaign . . . was launched [by] the Catholic Action of Manila. This organization urged Filipino Catholics to write their congressmen and senators asking them to 'kill' the Rizal bill. During a symposium which this group organized, one of the speakers, Fr. Jesus Cavanna, introduced as an authority on Rizal, said that the novels belong to the past and it would be harmful to read them because they present a false picture of conditions in the country at that time. He described the *Noli Me Tangere* as 'an attack on the clergy' and alleged that the novel was not really patriotic because out of 333 pages, only 25 contained patriotic passages while 120 contained anti-Catholic statements. Another speaker, radio commentator Jesus Paredes, said that since some parts of the novels had been declared 'objectionable matter' by the hierarchy, Catholics had the right to refuse to read them so as not to 'endanger their salvation.' . . .

"In reply to a threat that Catholic schools would close should the Rizal bill pass, Recto went on record in favor of the nationalization of all schools. He contended that nationalization might be just the step needed to foster a movement for vibrant nationalism among Filipinos. He did not really believe the threat. 'They are making too much profit which they can ill-afford to give up,' he said.

"Finally, on May 12, the month-old controversy ended with unanimous approval of a substitute measure [that] accommodated the objections of the Catholic hierarchy. Though it still provided that the basic texts in the collegiate courses should be the unexpurgated editions of the two novels, it was now possible for students to be exempted from using the unexpurgated editions on grounds of religious belief. Opponents of the original Recto version jubilantly claimed a 'complete victory.' Proponents felt they had at least gained something."

—Renato Constantino and Letizia Constantino, *The Philippines: The Continuing Past* (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), 297–98

Another shift in postcolonial nationalism pertained to the place of Chinese in the new republic. Despite a long and intimate history between coastal southern China and the Philippines, independent Filipinos began to exhibit what Caroline Hau calls “a general amnesia, a forgetting of the centrality of the ‘Chinese’ and the Chinese mestizo in the history and everyday life of the nation-state.”<sup>40</sup> Because the Chinese were well integrated into community life, state leaders—both nationalist and antinationalist—were forced to pass laws stipulating their “alien” origins in order to limit their participation in society and the economy. Hau notes that the Retail Trade Nationalization Act of 1954, passed to establish Filipino priority in obtaining business licenses, actually *exempts* “citizens and juridical entities of the United States.” In the eyes of Filipino leaders, Chinese became “objects of distrust and censure because they supposedly pervert the ‘true’ value of citizenship.” Their exclusion from the national community, however, did not prevent politicians from seeking them out for financial assistance. In scenes reminiscent of the Spanish era when top colonial and religious officials demanded bribes to allow Chinese entrepreneurs to conduct business, Filipino politicians tapped Chinese businessmen to enrich themselves or contribute to their electoral war chests.<sup>41</sup>

Relations between the majority and the other “outsider” group were less prominent in this period. There was no significant departure from Quezon’s policy of acknowledging cultural and religious differences between Muslim Filipinos and the Christian majority, even while noting their shared “Malay heritage.”<sup>42</sup> Neither were there substantive programs to strengthen the political assimilation of the Muslim communities into the nation-state. Filipino historians gave perfunctory recognition of the Muslims’ distinct identity, but never added their “local history” to the national narrative.<sup>43</sup> Politicians acknowledged the backwardness and poverty of the Muslim areas, but did nothing to promote their development. While the military was preoccupied with the Huk threat, stability in the southern Philippines was entrusted to Muslim politicians, who became adept at playing the patronage games of Manila. They passed on responsibility for their constituents’ welfare to local allies who ran their provinces like personal fiefdoms.<sup>44</sup> This indifference persisted through the terms of Roxas, Quirino, Magsaysay, Garcia, and Macapagal.

Not all Filipino-Chinese or Muslims were hurt by these policies during the first two decades of the Republic. The “nationalization law” had a silver lining for those Chinese businessmen, who, barred from the retail, rice, and corn industries, could afford to diversify into other growing sectors of the economy.<sup>45</sup> Their dynamic presence in manufacturing, banking, and the service sector eventually led to their resurrection as a major force in Philippine society. Unfortunately, this would only reinforce the association of ethnicity with capital.<sup>46</sup>

Muslim politicians with roots in the Quezon era continued their mutual accommodation with the central state as representatives of the Muslims in Manila and representatives of the central state in Mindanao. They employed a “traditional mask” of Muslim identity and datu leadership when they addressed the central state; this validated their claim to represent and defend the Muslims and reassured Manila leaders, who were “generally unfamiliar with and lacking access to the Muslim community.” But when they returned to the province, they donned the “modern mask” of the Filipino politician, demonstrating their ability to “bring the benefits of the modern state to their constituents: from patronage funds to new programs and even the latest political gossip from the capital.”<sup>47</sup> This position was tremendously advantageous, and from it they would dominate local politics until social tension on the closing frontier and a more aggressive national state began to undermine their authority.

## POSTWAR DEMOCRACY

Those who study the Philippines generally argue that there was little structural discontinuity from the colonial to the postcolonial period despite the interregnum of World War II. We suggest here, however, that although “the elite survived,” change did occur from the perspective of state formation. The Japanese occupation and the Second Republic broke the momentum toward state centralization that had begun under Manuel Quezon’s presidency of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

In the postwar period, virtual one-party rule gave way to two-party competition. The Nacionalista party faced ongoing challenges from the Liberal party, a breakaway faction that attracted many of the new “strongmen.” These new elites drew their strength from Commonwealth-era education that facilitated their rise out of lower-class origins, from coercive resources amassed as guerrilla leaders during the war, and from American-dispensed patronage and reparations after the war. They had no prewar commitment to the national state, and the Liberal party generally reflected their localist orientation.

With the defeat of the PKP and its peasant army, however, there was no sustained pressure for the parties to become ideological or programmatic institutions. The reformist impulses that brought Magsaysay to power began to wane as even the “man of the people” adjusted his rhetoric and actions to accommodate the interests of a landlord-controlled Congress. Nationalism had been a powerful mobilizer in the recent past, but by the Garcia and Macapagal era, little distinguished the Nacionalistas from the Liberal party, as both were controlled by local interests. Since party affiliation came to have no value other

than possession of a war chest and patronage network, party switching became habitual. Jose Maria Sison was certainly correct to remark that the two parties were the Pepsi and Coke of politics. Switching parties was always publicly justified by “principle,” of course, but the emptiness of this rhetoric was obvious to all.

The preeminence of patronage and local interests also created a new relationship between the executive and legislative branches. In this period, the legislature was able to immobilize executive initiatives through either outright rejection or watered-down legislation. But most characteristic was the way dominant social forces—family clans, settler leaders, landed elites—eviscerated the implementation of state initiatives through infiltration and corruption. The more the executive tried to accomplish, the more deals were needed. The bigger the program, the more spoils to be distributed. The stricter the controls, the more opportunities for bribery. It didn’t help that executive office holders were themselves enmeshed in the networks, which were predicated on safeguarding wealth and social power—whether old or new, legally or illegally gained.

If political office is viewed primarily as an opportunity for enrichment, these networks, which delivered votes and total obedience from below, were ideal vehicles. But where local power-holders controlled their resources with weapons and private armies, or could simply withhold votes or switch allegiance, state actors were forced to think twice before imposing central control or demanding professional, efficient, and corruption-free governance. Magsaysay, for example, cleaned up and improved the fighting prowess of the AFP, but never used it to break up the private armies. By the mid-1960s, the stalemate of the first five presidential administrations had yielded a high level of public cynicism toward the state. Yet the sheer accumulation of development-oriented executive agencies had created a discernable *internal* constituency for “governance” that could potentially be activated, as would happen under the next president, Ferdinand Marcos.

## NOTES

1. Amando Doronila, *The State, Economic Transformation, and Political Change in the Philippines, 1946–1972* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 92.

2. Alfred W. McCoy, ed., *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993).

3. Steven Rood, “Decentralization, Democracy, and Development,” in *The Philippines: New Directions in Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations*, ed. David G. Timberman (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 114.

4. Hernando J. Abaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* (New York: A. A. Wyn, 1946).

5. Frank Golay, *The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961), 18.
6. Carl H. Landé, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics*, Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series no. 6 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), 2.
7. Doronila, *The State*, 47.
8. Frank Golay, *Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), 59.
9. Golay, *Underdevelopment*, 59; Vicente B. Valdepeñas Jr. and Germelino M. Bautista, *The Emergence of the Philippine Economy* (Manila: Papyrus Press, 1977), 182.
10. Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Quezon City: Tala Pub. Services, 1975), 227.
11. Joseph Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (New York: Macmillan, 1942), 499.
12. Golay, *Underdevelopment*, 95.
13. Doronila, *The State*, 51–52.
14. Jesus B. Lava, *Memoirs of a Communist* (Pasig, The Philippines: Anvil Publishing, 2002), 147–77.
15. Frederick Wernstedt and Paul D. Simkins, “Migration and Settlement in Mindanao,” *Journal of Asian Studies* (November 1965): 92–94.
16. Lava, *Memoirs of a Communist*, 253–78.
17. Doronila, *The State*, 54.
18. Paul D. Hutchcroft, *Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 72–73.
19. Sylvia Maxfield and James Nolt, “Protectionism and the Internationalization of Capital: U.S. Sponsorship of Import Substitution Industrialization in the Philippines, Turkey, and Argentina,” *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990): 49–81.
20. Golay, *Underdevelopment*, 77.
21. Doronila, *The State*, 95.
22. Paul M. Monk, *Truth and Power: Robert S. Hardie and Land Reform Debates in the Philippines, 1950–1987* (Clayton, Vic., Australia: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990).
23. Frances Lucille Starner, *Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry: The Agrarian Impact on Philippine Politics, 1953–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 22.
24. Doronila, *The State*, 97.
25. Monk, *Truth and Power*.
26. Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, *The Philippines: The Continuing Past* (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), 312.
27. Edita A. Tan, “Income Distribution in the Philippines,” in *Philippine Economic Problems in Perspective*, ed. Jose Encarnacion Jr. et al. (Quezon City: Institute of Economic Development and Research, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, 1976), 218.
28. Mario V. Bolasco, *Points of Departure: Essays on Christianity, Power, and Social Change*, ed. Edicio de la Torre (Manila: St. Scholastica’s College, 1994), 239–44.

29. Quoted in Lewis E. Gleeck Jr., *The Third Philippine Republic, 1946–1972* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1993), 212.

30. *Philippine Free Press*, July 8, 1972, quoted in Gleeck, *Third Philippine Republic*, 242.

31. Gleeck, *Third Philippine Republic*, 227–37.

32. Alfred W. McCoy, *Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), 131–35.

33. Miguel Cuaderno Sr., *Problems of Economic Development: The Philippines, a Case Study* (Manila: Miguel Cuaderno Sr., 1964), 7, 48–49, 96–99.

34. Emmanuel S. De Dios and Paul Hutchcroft, “Political Economy,” in *The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges*, ed. Arsenio M. Balisacan and Hal Hill (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), 48.

35. *Philippine Free Press*, May 26, 1962.

36. Claro M. Recto, *The Recto Reader: Excerpts from the Speeches of Claro M. Recto*, ed. Renato Constantino (Manila: Recto Memorial Foundation, 1965).

37. Hernando J. Abaya, *The CLU Story: Fifty Years of Struggle for Civil Liberties* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1987); Marites N. Sison and Yvonne T. Chua, *Armando J. Malay: A Guardian of Memory: The Life and Times of a Filipino Journalist and Activist* (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 2002), 103.

38. Renato Constantino, *The Making of a Filipino: A Story of Colonial Politics* (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1969), 200–240.

39. Francisco Nemenzo, “An Irrepressible Revolution: The Decline and Resurgence of the Philippine Communist Movement,” manuscript, November 13, 1984, 44–47.

40. Caroline S. Hau, *Necessary Fictions: Philippine Literature and the Nation, 1946–1980* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 126.

41. Joseph L. Piang, “The Chinese and the Philippine Political Process,” in *Philippine-Chinese Profile: Essays and Studies*, ed. Charles J. McCarthy. (Manila: Pagkakaisa sa Pag-unlad, 1974), 93–96.

42. Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the U.S. Congress [Manuel Quezon], *The Filipino People* (October 1912): 5.

43. Alunan Glang, *Muslim Secession or Integration?* (Quezon City: R. P. Garcia, 1969).

44. Peter G. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos: Heritage and Horizon* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1979), 185–87.

45. Teresita Ang See, “The Chinese in the Philippine Political Process: From Retail Trade Nationalization to Retail Trade Liberalization,” in *The Chinese in the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives* (Manila: Kaisa para sa Kaunlaran, 1997), 2:69–84.

46. See Caroline S. Hau, “‘Who Will Save Us from the Law?’ The Criminal State and the Illegal Alien in Post-1986 Philippines,” in *Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam*, ed. Vicente L. Rafael (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, 1999), 128–51.

47. Patricio N. Abinales, *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 188.