Introduction

The vast majority of violent conflicts in the past half-century have taken place at the substate level, including the recent or ongoing wars in Congo, Colombia, Palestine, India, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, Yugoslavia, Angola, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Russia, and Georgia.[1] In the 1990s, only 8 of the 110 armed conflicts around the world were between states. Most of the remaining wars were waged between minorities and their governments over demands for national self-determination.[2] In prosecuting these campaigns, the leaders of resistance movements have used terrorism and guerilla warfare to achieve autonomy for the minorities they claim to represent. Cases include the Palestinians in Israel; the Tamils in Sri Lanka; the Chechen separatists in Russia; the Transdniestrians in Moldova; the Kashmiris in India; the Kosovar Albanians in Yugoslavia; the newly independent East Timorese; and the periodically secessionist Acehnese in Indonesia. Lacking established protocols for halting violence at the substate level, such conflicts can drag on for years or even decades, as we have seen in Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, Northern Ireland, Palestine, and Cyprus.

This book addresses important puzzles that lie at the heart of these struggles. On the macro-level, it investigates why ethnicity[3] is still so politically salient—why so many internal conflicts are waged in the name of self-determination and why tribal conflicts persist in the face of modernization and globalization. I suggest that the discourse of minority rights and self-determination—promulgated by the victors of World War I to serve their geopolitical interests and ensure the stability of the postwar order—effectively constructed both the category of national minorities and the methods they later used to challenge their governments. Today, minority leaders around the world employ this discourse as a means of extracting concessions from their state centers. In some cases, this has improved the status of marginalized groups. In other cases, however, it has worsened and prolonged conflicts at the substate level.

On the micro-level, this book explores why minority leaders vary the intensity of their demands (sometimes rapidly) over time while their grievances remain relatively constant. To illustrate the bargaining logic underlying this behavior, I introduce a model that formalizes the interactions between minority representatives and their host government in the presence of an external lobby actor.[4] The central prediction of the model is that when the minority's external patron credibly signals interventionist intent, minority leaders are likely to radicalize their demands against the center, even when the government has committed itself to moderation. It follows that the successful mediation of triadic conflicts is possible only after relations have been normalized between the minority's host government and lobby actor at the international level. This requires de-triangulating the conflict into separate, and thus more tractable, dyadic disputes between the state government and external lobbyist, on the one hand, and the majority and minority, on the other.[5]

The Puzzle of Minority Radicalization

The literature on minority mobilization is vast, particularly with respect to secessionism and irredentism.[6] Theories of mobilization may be divided broadly into structural and dynamic variants. Structural theories, in turn, fall into three broad subcategories (see table I.1).

Primordialist or essentialist arguments hold that nations today have always existed in one form or other as "proto-nations" or "ethnies" with cultural roots that extend far back in time. Once a group has "awakened" to its identity as a nation in the modern sense, it is only natural that it will seek self-determination—through violence, if necessary. This logic leads us to expect that groups with distinctive national identities will ultimately mobilize around separatist demands in order to achieve the nation-state ideal. Thus, the Chechens sought to secede from the Russian Federation due to profound ethnic differences between the Chechens and Russians. Similarly, the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia rallied around irredentism because they saw themselves as a constituent part of a larger German nation rather than an ethnic German minority in a Slavic state.[7]

More nuanced social psychological accounts acknowledge that ethnic groups are constructed social forms as opposed to organic entities that developed naturally over time.[8] However, because human beings are tribal by

Table I.1. Theories of minority radicalization

Theory	Causal logic		
Structural theories			
Primordialism/essentialism Economic theories/grievances Institutionalist theories	Structural conditions (constant)	+ ? → (variable)	Minority demands (variable)
Dynamic theories			
Elite-based accounts	Elite incentives (variable)	→	Minority demands (variable)
Ethnic security dilemma/commitment problems	Ethnic fears (variable)	→	Minority demands (variable)
Ethnic bargaining	Bargaining leverage (variable)	→	Minority demands (variable)

nature, their primary loyalties lie with their perceived community—be it an ethnic group, tribe, or nation—for which they are very often willing to fight and die.[9] Roger Petersen advances an explicitly psychological theory of ethnic mobilization, arguing that four human emotions—fear, hatred, resentment, and rage—account for both the nature and intensity of ethnic violence. He allows that these emotions must be triggered by external events, but asserts that "the motivation to participate in or support ethnic violence and discrimination [is] inherent in human nature."[10] Petersen thus provides insights into the psychological bases of ethnic mobilization, while remaining agnostic as to what sets this mechanism into motion.

Stuart Kaufman sheds light on another aspect of ethnic mobilization by unpacking the narratives that transmit human emotions into collective action. He begins by observing that ethnic entrepreneurs could not stir up mass hatred if there was not some preexisting historical understanding to support their racist vitriol. According to his "symbolic politics" theory of ethnic violence, "people respond to ethnic symbols and mobilize for war only if a widely known and accepted ethnic myth-symbol complex justifies hostility to the other group."[11] Thus, it might not have been possible to rally the Serbs against the Croats in 1990s Yugoslavia had there not been a collective memory of crimes committed against them by Croatia's Ustaše regime during World War II.[12]

A related set of theories holds that preexisting group traits such as size, location, and territorial compactness have a direct impact on minority mobilization. Stephen Van Evera argues, for example, that groups that can be easily "rescued" by their homeland states are unlikely to rally around separatism because their very ease of rescue deters their governments from discriminating against them. At the same time, groups for which ethnic rescue is impossible—because they are either too small or sparsely populated—are also unlikely to mobilize for secession due to the infeasibility of such goals. If, however, ethnic rescue is possible but difficult—when the minority is separated from its homeland state by "enemy territory" or when there is significant ethnic intermingling on the local level—there may be incentives for "rescuers to jump through any windows of opportunity that arise."[13] Monica Toft advances a different kind of geographical argument, positing that groups that are concentrated within a "minority region" are more likely to view this territory as their homeland and consequently non-negotiable or "indivisible." If the center or majority also deems this region indivisible from the state, then secessionist conflict may emerge.[14] Whether it is primordial ties, human emotions, collective understandings, or ethnic geography—the above theories all hold that relatively invariant traits play a crucial role in ethnic mobilization.

A second set of structural arguments—*economic theories*—posits that underlying economic disparities between the minority and majority may over time give rise to demands for secession or irredentism. In cases where the region is rich (Slovenia in the former Yugoslavia), its leaders may seek political independence in order to avoid subsidizing a relatively impoverished center. Where the region is poor (Slovakia in the former Czechoslovakia), minority representatives may pursue secession to prevent exploitation by a relatively advanced center.[15] Similarly, *relative deprivation* or grievance theories hold that groups suffering economic discrimination or income disparities will mobilize around collective demands for redress once they have the opportunity or the resources to do so.[16] In this view, minorities will endure significant repression or intergroup inequalities if they are politically weak, as seen in the cases of Jews and Roma in interwar Europe. Mobilization upon economic frustration is only likely when political openings emerge to facilitate collective action. While these accounts have a strong intuitive appeal, recent empirical work casts doubt on the causal influence that either regional disparities or other economic grievances have on group radicalization.[17]

The economic factors that *do* appear to matter are those that directly empower a group to rebel. These include economic incentives for individual members to engage in rebellion (the expected benefits of fighting versus the costs of withdrawing from the normal economy), funding from diasporas, the low cost of recruits, and the existence of primary commodities available for extortion. Thus, economic considerations mainly come into play—at least when it comes to ethnic violence—insofar as they leverage the strategic power of the group.[18]

A third set of structural theories, *institutionalist* or *constructivist* accounts, posits that arrangements for minority autonomy give rise to separatism by creating salient national identities and by providing focal points around which independence movements can take shape.[19] Ronald Suny notes that although the Soviet Nationalities Policies had been implemented to placate and hopefully homogenize the Soviet peoples, they instead created national forms upon which individuals could mobilize for independence as the Soviet empire began to collapse.[20] Dmitry Gorenburg extends this argument by showing exactly *how* these institutions mobilized the masses both "directly, by creating constituencies that support nationalism and providing them with resources, and indirectly, by shaping collective identities and creating social networks that foster the spread of nationalism among the populace."[21] In the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, minorities with republican status were particularly primed for independence because they already had the trappings of statehood, including banks, national academies, local governments, and communist parties. Groups with republican status therefore had a tendency to pursue secession, whereas most provinces, regions, and oblasts did not.[22] Philip Roeder posits that successful nation-state projects may even *require* preexisting "segmental institutions"—arrangements of minority autonomy at the substate level—that can "align" the various factors necessary to achieve political independence.[23]

The second institutional story has to do with the weakening of the center itself. Given that the mobilizational power of the minority is measured against the repressive power of the state, it follows that when the state center is overstretched or incapacitated, the relative strength of the group is correspondingly enhanced. Valerie Bunce observes that the implosion of Soviet authority was at least as important as the strengthening of the titular minorities in the destruction of the Yugoslav and Soviet states.[24] The same could be said of the nineteenth-century Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, whose constituent nations gained power as their imperial centers went down the path of long, slow decline.

Theories focusing on structural variables such as ethnic geography, social psychological factors, autonomous institutions, and underlying grievances have enriched our understanding as to why some groups engage in separatism and ethnic violence whereas others do not. Although the relative causal weight of these factors varies from case to case, each represents an important piece of the puzzle of minority radicalization. Nonetheless, these arguments tend to overemphasize the impact of domestic or individual-level variables on the process of mobilization. The international scholarship, meanwhile, focuses overly on inanimate features of the *system*—including international norms, global finance, conflict spillover, and demonstration effects.[25] What is missing in the literature is a nuanced analysis of the ways in which *external actors*—and particularly regional players—influence minority behavior at the substate level. The theory of ethnic bargaining aims to address this gap. The theory developed in this book contributes to existing accounts in a second way by demonstrating how bargaining dynamics interact with structural features in the environment to produce radicalization (see table I.2). In doing so, it helps account for the surprising fluctuations in group claims over time. For example, separatist leaders periodically abandon their quest for sovereignty in return for a place in the government or some other side payment (e.g., the Malay-Muslims in Thailand and the Kewris of Mauritania). Others have made 180-degree reversals in their stated aims. The Baluchi leaders in Pakistan, for example, sought statehood when Pakistan gained independence, but later reverted to an integrationist stance. By the mid-1970s, however, they were again calling for sovereignty. Very often minority elites seek independence during a regime change, only to request effective re-annexation a few years (or even months) later. The leadership of Belarus in the former Soviet Union and the Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea are examples of the latter pattern.[26]

Two other theoretical approaches claim insight into the timing and intensity of intercommunal conflict. *Elite theories* broadly hold that political leaders mobilize people on an ethnic basis to maintain popular support in the face of international or domestic change.[27] V. P. Gagnon, Jr., for example, argues that ethnic violence "is provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity." This strategy enables "endangered elites [to] fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilize the population against the status quo."[28]

While most of these theories focus on the behavior of state leaders, it may be argued that *minority* leaders too, play the ethnic card for private gain. In his account of the Chechen independence movement, Valery Tishkov notes that secessionism

> is by no means always based on plans for improving the life of the entire population; indeed, it most often promises the contrary. However, for the initiators of independence and a certain part of the population, a "free state" regime can bring quick rewards, including economic ones.[29]

By making temporal predictions, instrumentalist theories would appear to account for the timing of minority radicalization (see table I.1). However, as a causal mechanism, elite interests do not tell us very much. For one thing, there are certainly more opportunistic elites than there are nationalist movements. Why don't self-aggrandizing or threatened leaders everywhere play the ethnic card? Although nationalists dominated the political landscapes of postcommunist Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia, they were marginalized in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria. Second, the fortunes of ethnic entrepreneurs can be seen to wax and wane over time. The Nazi

Table I.2. Triggers of post–World War II secessionist movements

Trigger		Cases
After/anticipation of regime change	Security threat	Afars (Eritrea), Arakanese (Myanmar), Armenians (Azerbaijan), Bagandans (Uganda), Basters (Namibia), Ewes (Ghana), Kachins (Myanmar), Karens (Myanmar), Kashmiris (India), Lozis (Zambia), Lubas (Congo), Lundas/Yekes (Congo), Nagas (India), Palestinians (Israel), Serbs (Croatia), Sikhs (India), Southerners (Sudan), Turkmen (China)
	No security threat	Abkhazis (Georgia—early 1990s), Azeris (Iran), Bakongans (Angola), Basques (France), Bougainvilleans (Papua New Guinea), Buryats (Russia), Cabindans (Angola), Chechens (Russia—early 1990s), Crimean Russians (Ukraine), Croats (Bosnia), East Timorese (Indonesia—post-Suharto period), Ewes (Togo), Kumyks (Russia), Lezgins (Russia), Pashtuns (Pakistan), Serbs (Bosnia), South Ossetians (Georgia), South Tyroleans (Italy), Tatars (Russia), Tuvinians (Russia), Uzbeks (Kyrgyzstan), Transdniestrians (Moldova)
Increased repression		Baluchis (Pakistan), Ibos (Nigeria), Kewris (Mauritania), Kurds (Iraq), Kurds (Turkey), Malay-Muslims (Thailand), Mons (Myanmar), Saharawis (Morocco), Shans (Myanmar), Sri Lankan Tamils, Tibetans (China)
Decreased repression/ weakened state		Afars (Ethiopia), Basques (Spain), Isaaqs (Somalia), Kosovar Albanians (1980s Yugoslavia), Oromo (Ethiopia), Somalis (Ethiopia)

Table I.2—continued

Trigger	Cases
Economic reasons/other	Acehnese (Indonesia), Assamese (India), Casamançais (Senegal), Catholics in Northern Ireland (United Kingdom), Moros (Philippines), Native Hawaiians (United States), Papuans (Indonesia), Quebecois (Canada), Tripuras (India), Tuaregs (Mali)

Sources: Ted Robert Gurr et al., Minorities at Risk (MAR) project files., http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/; Minority Rights Group, *The World Directory of Minorities* (London, UK: Minority Rights Group International, 1997).

Party in Germany, for example, languished on the political sidelines for decades before gaining widespread support in the 1930s. This suggests that the role of individual leaders is significantly constrained by the environment in which he or she operates.[30] Indeed, the rate at which nationalizing leaders reinvent themselves, or fall out of political favor, casts doubt on the causal impact that elites themselves wield in the process of mobilization. Finally, the notion that opportunistic leaders play the ethnic card to gain or retain popular support simply begs the question as to why this "card" is such a potent populist tool. Because other groups are seen as a threat? Because of rising economic or political instability? In either case, nationalizing elites would then be the by-product of larger environmental conditions rather than the principal force itself.

The *ethnic fears approach* offers yet another dynamic account of minority mobilization. One variant, known as the ethnic security dilemma, holds that groups mobilize in response to the security vacuum brought about by state collapse. The logic follows that, in the context of emerging anarchy, it is difficult to distinguish the offensive from the defensive intentions of other nonstate actors. The resulting uncertainty on both sides, in addition to the considerable advantage of offensive mobilization in civil warfare, creates powerful incentives for each group to strike preemptively or secede, thus increasing the likelihood of ethnic war.[31]

Barry Posen has argued, for example, that the Serbian-Croatian war in 1990s Yugoslavia was the outgrowth of conditions of extreme uncertainty and mutual suspicions concerning what the other would do in the absence of governmental restraint. After the collapse of federal authority, the Croats and Serbs were forced to provide for their own security in an environment conducive to mutual perceptions of threat.[32] This ultimately gave rise to a bloody, secessionist war.

Although persuasive in the abstract, empirical evidence shows that most of the secessionist movements since World War II began when the state was in the process of regime change or transition, not collapse (see table 1-2). To cite a few examples, the Basque and South Tyrolean separatists sought to secede from postwar Spain and Italy, both of which had stable governments; Chechen and Crimean Russian leaders declared their regions' independence from their weakened but stable post-Soviet governments; the Acehnese and East Timorese revived their separatist campaigns against post-Suharto Indonesia—hardly the picture of state failure. Moreover, the ethnic security dilemma cannot account for the many *non*violent secessionist movements. For instance, the Lezgins, Tuvinians, Tatars, and Buryats of post-Soviet Russia; the Basters of newly independent Namibia; the Azeris of postwar Iran; the Bougainvilleans of Papua New Guinea; the Afars of Eritrea; the Papuans of Indonesia; and the Tuaregs of Mali have all undertaken peaceful campaigns for independence. The ethnic security dilemma may explain cases in which a vacuum of state power was followed by separatist violence. However, such cases are extremely rare—most postwar secessionist movements were launched against states whose central governments were still intact, and many of these were prosecuted peacefully or with minimal violence.

A second variant of ethnic fears theories, credible commitment arguments, broadly holds that secessionism emerges during political transition when the state center can no longer guarantee minority protection.[33] James Fearon has argued that ethnic conflict in postcommunist Europe is largely due to the fact that "ethnic majorities are unable to commit themselves not to exploit ethnic minorities in a new state."[34] Fearing future transgressions, such minorities will seek to exit the state while they still can—before a potentially hostile regime consolidates power.

Contrary to the expectations of this approach, however, over half of the secessionist movements in the postwar period emerged in the context of a relatively *benign* regime, which posed little or no threat to the minority. Even more striking, many movements were launched only after authoritarian governments had given way to liberal, pro-minority regimes. For example, the Acehnese and East Timorese campaigns of independence were revived in 1998—after the repressive Suharto government had ceded power to a comparatively moderate administration. Moreover, almost none of the secessionist movements in Eastern Europe emerged until *after* the collapse of their antinational totalitarian regimes.[35] This pattern suggests that secessionism is not always—or even most of the time—driven by fears of future exploitation.

The value of the ethnic fears approach is that it generates clear predictions concerning the *timing* of mobilization, while providing clues as to why the fortunes of nationalist leaders wax and wane over time. The major shortcoming of such theories is that they are extremely thin. Because the *mechanics* of mobilization are poorly specified, they explain neither how political transition generates minority radicalization nor why in most cases this does not occur.[36]

Second, these arguments tend to overemphasize defensive motivations, which is only one factor in the collective action calculus. In competitive games such as politics and even war, players make their decisions on the basis of mixed motives of opportunism *and* fear. As noted earlier, the empirical record reveals that most demands for secession were made when the center was relatively weak and benign, rather than strong and threatening, as predicted by ethnic fears theories.[37] To address this imbalance, I offer a model that integrates defensive and offensive motives in a competitive game between the minority and the center over state resources. By situating this game in the wider context of interstate and trans-state politics, I hope to generate more accurate predictions concerning fluctuations in group claim-making.

Ethnic Bargaining and Power Perceptions

This book develops a theory of ethnic bargaining that challenges much of the conventional wisdom concerning minority mobilization. Rather than being a product of *separate* inputs—preexisting preferences plus group capacity gives rise to mobilization—the perceptions of increased leverage *themselves* create collective desires for more radical demands. Minority leaders then use these demands to bargain for greater concessions from the central government.

This formulation builds on a central insight in the social movements literature that grievances alone cannot generate collective mobilization—there must also be a political opportunity structure to help transmit these grievances into action.[38] Peter Eisinger defines political opportunity structure as "elements in the environment [that] impose certain constraints on political activity or open avenues for it."[39] According to Sidney Tarrow, collective action is enabled by the "expansion" of the political opportunity structure, which may occur when a government liberalizes or when its rulers become preoccupied with foreign engagements.[40] The bargaining theory takes this line of reasoning one step further, arguing that, by leveraging the minority, the opportunity structure is *itself* a potent motive for group radicalization.

This book explores the impact of two types of opportunity structures on ethnic bargaining. The first is the *institutional* opportunity structure—

defined here as a transient political environment that emerges, often unexpectedly, to alter the balance of power between the minority and the center. Examples include the "event generated influences" that Mark Beissinger argues led to the disintegration of the Soviet state. In his account, the "'*glasnost*' tide of nationalism" that emerged in the Baltics provoked similar movements in the less-empowered Caucasian Republics "largely because of their ability to ride the tide of nationalism generated from the actions of others."[41] Consistent with the definition above, these openings were both impermanent and, for the most part, limited to the East Bloc.

Institutional opportunities may produce mobilization even in the absence of salient collective grievances. For instance, the Paris Peace Conference that redrew Europe's political boundaries after World War I served as an opportunity structure galvanizing Sudeten Germans to mobilize around irredentism, despite credible guarantees of protection by the new Czechoslovak government. Another opportunity structure emerged in postcommunist Czechoslovakia in the form of negotiations over the federal constitution. In the course of these talks, Slovak leaders gradually radicalized their demands to extract ever-increasing concessions from the Czechs—despite the fact that the Slovaks were net beneficiaries of the federation. In both cases, it was the opportunity structure, rather than underlying group grievances, that served as the principal catalyst of collective action. Meanwhile, truly beleaguered groups such as the Roma remained quiescent.

Discursive opportunity structures, in contrast, are generally longer-lasting, more malleable, and adaptable to a range of settings. They inform not only the legitimate forms of political organization, but also the means by which these "actors" can pursue their goals. In the contemporary period, ethnic groups are the primary political challengers to national governments, and claim-making is the principal mode by which they bargain with the center over state resources. The ethnic bargaining framework provides these challengers with the "normative toolbox and ideational resource pool that [can] be deployed in pursuit of political objectives."[42]

After tracing the origins of this discursive opportunity structure in chapter 1, the subsequent chapter shows how ethnic bargaining plays out on the *micro*-level to produce shifts in group claims in a single case. In brief, the bargaining model holds that group radicalization is driven by shifting perceptions of relative power against the center. These perceptions are informed both by changes in the institutional opportunity structure and by the actions of the group's external patron (if one exists).[43] For instance, a diplomatic intervention by a homeland state may lead minority representatives to believe that they enjoy leverage against the center. They may respond by escalating their demands to territorial autonomy or secession in an effort to extract side payments from their host government. The Sri

Lankan Tamil Tigers, for example, ratcheted up their demands from affirmative action in the 1970s to secession in the 1980s, largely in reaction to signals of heightened support from neighboring India—particularly their co-ethnics in Tamil Nadu. Conversely, minority leaders are likely to moderate their demands in response to perceptions of diminished outside support. The South Tyroleans of Italy, for example, *de*-escalated their demands from irredentism to cultural autonomy once Austria withdrew its claims on South Tyrol after World War II. In this way, minority representatives continually recalibrate their demands against the center in response to perceived shifts in leverage over time.

Nonstate actors, too, have a major impact on minority behavior. In his work on international activism, Clifford Bob notes that NGOs and transnational activist networks (TAN) can trigger minority mobilization by "[bestowing] legitimacy on challengers who might otherwise have meager recognition," by strengthening challengers with financial support and technical expertise, and by "demonstrating that a movement is not alone, that the world cares, and that an arduous conflict may not be fruitless" (for more on this, see chapter 1).[44]

In the present analysis, external lobby actors and especially kin states (e.g., Serbia in the case of Bosnian Serbs; or Somalia in the case of Ethiopian Somalis) receive special attention.[45] To isolate the effects of power perceptions on minority behavior, I use comparative case analysis to bracket or "control for" many of the structural factors associated with minority mobilization—including historical enmities or "myth complexes," ethnic consciousness, collective grievances, and economic disparities. This allows me to determine the independent influence that the actions of the minority's host government, its external patron (assuming one exists), and changes in the political opportunity structure have on group mobilization.

External patrons also influence political alignments in the host state. Timor Kuran notes that "[f]oreign ethnic activists can heighten a nation's awareness of its divisions, and they can reward expressions of ethnicity."[46] This has important implications for the logic of "ethnic outbidding" in deeply divided societies. According to Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, outbidding occurs when elites compete for the support of their respective ethnic constituencies by attempting to "outflank" one another on ethnic issues.[47] This serves to amplify ethnic cleavages on the ground, increasing the odds of sectarian conflict. Donald Horowitz is also pessimistic about the potential of democratic institutions for inducing inter-ethnic cooperation in severely divided societies.[48] This is because individuals in such societies are predisposed to support parties that represent their own ethnic group to the exclusion of others. Divisions in society thus map onto the political sphere, further exacerbating ethnic tensions on the ground.

Elise Giuliano observes, however, that both theories overpredict ethnic extremism, partly because they wrongly assume that voter preferences in divided societies are intense and polarized along the single dimension of ethnicity. She demonstrates that, by framing issues in nonexclusivist terms, political elites can "generate heterogeneous preferences within groups, common preferences across ethnic groups, and a constituency of political moderates backing certain issues."[49] Kanchan Chandra, too, argues that individuals in patronage-democracies like India will not necessarily vote for ethnic parties if they believe that a nonethnic party is more likely to deliver material benefits.[50] This implies that deeply divided societies do not necessarily lead to ethnically divisive politics. Jóhanna Birner corroborates this thesis, showing that divided democracies yield far more inter-ethnic cooperation than they do conflict.[51]

I build on these insights in chapter 2 by introducing a spatial model that maps the politics of a hypothetical divided society onto a two-dimensional policy space. Following Giuliano, a second dimension has been added to the first dimension of ethnicity to represent the ability of elites to break out of the logic of ethnic outbidding by brokering inter-ethnic compromises along a second issue dimension. Importantly, however, their ability and incentive to do so are greatly circumscribed by the prevailing salience of ethnicity in domestic politics.

Nationalist signals from either the host government or an external lobby actor tend to increase the level of ethnic salience in society. This has the effect of politicizing group differences, leading in extreme cases to sectarian violence. This occurred in Kosovo in the late 1990s, when growing Serbian hostility and partisan intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) increased tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs on the ground. In the absence of nationalist signals, however, alternative cleavages, such as class, may gain relatively greater salience, inducing inter-ethnic alliances along class lines.[52] Yugoslavia underwent such a transformation after World War II when powerful neighboring states withdrew from their respective zones of interest. This lessened the salience of ethnic markers in postwar Yugoslavia, allowing for the emergence of a pan-ethnic alliance around a common Yugoslav identity.

Ethnic bargaining often has perverse consequences for minorities. This is because the signals that lead groups to challenge their governments may also provoke anti-minority retributions. During the NATO campaign to drive Serbian forces out of Kosovo, for example, an estimated ten thousand ethnic Albanian civilians were killed—mostly by Serbs. This is ten times the number that had been killed in the year leading up to the intervention.[53] U.S.-NATO Commanding General Wesley Clark asserted that the Serbian response to the air strikes was "entirely predictable. . . . The military authorities fully anticipated the vicious approach that Milošević would adopt [once the bombing was under way], as well as the terrible efficiency with which he would carry it out."[54] When a group challenges the center with the expectation of support that never materializes, the backlash can be particularly devastating. Cases of ill-fated minority uprisings include the Kurds in 1990s Iraq, the Tutsis in Rwanda, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Muslims in Bosnia, the Palestinians in the West Bank, and the East Timorese in Indonesia. Alan Kuperman notes that "[i]n most cases of mass killing since World War II—unlike the Holocaust—the victim group has triggered its own demise by violently challenging the authority of the state."[55] The tension between the promise of minority empowerment and what it delivers in practice is a major theme of this book.

Before proceeding further, some definitions are in order.[56] An *ethnic or communal group* is defined here as a community of common descent whose membership is based on one or more shared traits—cultural, linguistic, religious, or otherwise.[57] A *minority* is an ethnic group that is numerically inferior to the politically dominant group in the state or de facto sovereign unit; the term *majority* refers to the group that exercises political dominance in the state, even if it is not in the numerical majority. Examples include the political majorities of apartheid South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi, and other states—groups that are actually minorities in absolute terms.

Ethnic bargaining can now be defined as the modes and practices by which minorities negotiate with the majority over the group's claimant status to state institutions. If successful, the minority may extract concessions from the majority-controlled government, including transfer payments, power-sharing agreements, and/or inclusion in political coalitions. *Majority, host* or *state government, center,* and *dominant group* are used interchangeably throughout the book to refer to the dominant political actor with which the minority bargains at the substate level. An *outside lobby actor,* in turn, denotes any state, organization, or private interest that lobbies directly on behalf of the minority in the course of these negotiations. There are many other external actors (including the European Union; the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE; and the Council of Europe, CoE) that generally refrain from partisan intervention and instead pressure the minority's host government and/or lobby state to change its policies toward the minority. This distinction is important, for where they do not intervene directly on behalf of the minority, such entities cannot be classified as lobby actors. They are instead exogenous influences on host state and lobby actor preferences, which in turn inform minority calculations as to whether to radicalize.[58]

Finally, a *group demand* or *claim* is defined here as a bid by minority representatives against the center for a degree of control over state institutions. In this context, *minority radicalization* or *mobilization* denotes the collective expression of, or support for, more extreme demands by the minority rank and file. I thus use shifts in the extremity of group demands as a proxy for minority radicalization.[59]

It might be reasonably objected that group demands are a poor measure of radicalization because minority elites have incentives to overstate their preferences in order to win greater concessions from the center. Although this is theoretically possible, in practice group demands are inextricably tied to minority radicalization for at least three reasons. First, claim-making effectively commits a group to collective action—ranging from civil protest to organized violence. Once a recognized minority representative makes an extreme demand, the center can either grant the minority concessions or launch a preventive strike. In either case, the group is locked into mobilization—receiving either a collective reward or, alternatively, a collective punishment.

Second, although the exact distinction between cultural autonomy and territorial autonomy is debatable, it is universally recognized that the latter constitutes a greater challenge than the former. Movement up and down this continuum of claims thus indicates minority radicalization and moderation, respectively. Establishing a demand along this continuum also signals the minority's reservation value—the minimum its leaders will accept in return for peaceful cohabitation with the majority.[60] If they believe they enjoy significant leverage against the center, they may put forward more extreme demands, signaling that the group is prepared to take up arms if the government fails to grant generous concessions. Third, these demands enjoy legitimacy in the international discourse and therefore help mobilize external support for the minority's cause.

In sum, claim-making is central to minority mobilization because it communicates bargaining postures, commits group members to a set of collective behaviors, and attracts outside assistance to the side of the minority. Group demands may even take on a life of their own, leading minority leaders to adopt a more intransigent stance in negotiations with the center because their constituents have internalized these claims.

This book tests the theory of ethnic bargaining using comparative and longitudinal analysis of seven cases of minority mobilization in east central Europe. I have conducted extensive fieldwork on Moravians and Slovaks in postcommunist Czechoslovakia as well as on Hungarian minorities in postcommunist Slovakia and Romania. I have also carried out a detailed historical investigation into the behavior of the Sudeten Germans in interwar Czechoslovakia to determine whether the model travels over time. Finally, I have conducted a plausibility probe into the model's generalizability across space by examining minority behavior in postcommunist Yugoslavia.

There are several potential objections to my case selection. It could be argued, for example, that a model of minority radicalization cannot properly be tested using cases drawn from a relatively peaceful region in Europe. Despite the plausibility of this concern, I have selected these cases partly to correct for what I believe is a bias toward the study of violence in the ethnic conflict literature.[61] Much of this research selects on the dependent variable by focusing on outbreaks of sectarian bloodshed. In doing so, this scholarship places disproportionate emphasis on explaining how or why groups mobilize (sometimes to participate in violence), largely disregarding the question of how groups become *de*-mobilized.

A second problem is that episodes of violence usually feature all or most of the following: nationalizing elites, ethnic outbidding, economic deprivation, institutional breakdown, the presence of arms and/or mercenaries, internal factionalization, and intervention by outside states or organizations. In the midst of this complexity, it is nearly impossible to sort out which factors, if any, are crucial to the escalation of conflict and which are of secondary importance; in such moments, violence is quite simply overdetermined. Finally, a cross-sectional analysis of snapshots of violent conflict cannot be used to satisfactorily separate the causes from the effects of violence. I avoid this problem by tracing minority-majority relations longitudinally through periods of *both* peace and conflict. By examining fluctuations in mobilization over time, it is possible to identify crucial antecedent conditions that are absent in the first state but present in the second.

A second possible objection is that, with an analysis confined to cases from east central Europe, there is no way of knowing whether minority mobilization plays out differently elsewhere. In other words, what we see in Europe may be function of features unique to the region rather than a reflection of universal features of minority politics. Although there is some danger of such a bias, selecting cases from the same region offers significant advantages for hypothesis testing. By examining seven cases of minority-majority relations from the same region, I effectively control for much social, economic, and historical variation in identifying the influence of key factors on minority mobilization. For example, comparing the Slovak and Moravian movements in postcommunist Czechoslovakia helps me challenge the argument that Slovak separatism was a direct outgrowth of its historical experience of autonomy under Austro-Hungary, because the Moravians also had autonomous arrangements under the dual monarchy but failed to advance separatist demands. This case selection also helps control for ethnic variation. East central Europe is home to many minority groups with shared ethnic characteristics; variation in the demands advanced by their leaders therefore cannot be attributed to the ascriptive traits that they have in common. For example, by comparing the behavior of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania, I control for the unknown effect of being Hungarian in determining the causes of goal differentiation between the two groups. Moreover, the canon of nationalism studies is strongly informed by the history of minority politics in east central Europe.[62] By revisiting these cases, I critically reexamine the prevailing interpretations of these movements. Scholars of elite theories, for example, have cited the negotiated Czechoslovak split in 1993 and the Sudeten German fifth column in interwar Czechoslovakia as decisive evidence that minority rebellion is the result of elite manipulation. These cases therefore constitute tough tests for the theory of ethnic bargaining.

More generally, it may be objected that this theory problematically treats groups as unitary actors in the political arena. I submit that this critique misunderstands the purpose of strategic modeling as it is used here. To yield valid results, the model requires neither that groups behave monolithically nor that they remain unchanged over time, nor even that they have clearly defined boundaries. It merely brackets the prevailing ethnic landscape in any given case to generate predictions concerning how the interactions between the leaders of the minority, majority, and external lobby actor influence ethnic mobilization.

Nor do I assume that groups "speak" with a single voice. Given that there are nearly always multiple voices competing to represent a group, I measure group claims as the *dominant* voice from within this cacophony. This also helps me identify the legitimate leaders of the group. Since extreme positions may be marginalized at some times but dominant at others, it only makes sense to measure group claims *as the most popular (or mainstream) position within the group at every point in time.* Thus, minority or group demands refer to the positions of recognized minority representatives in the same way that government or state claims refer to the positions of recognized state leaders.

Moreover, groups need not be homogeneous to be coherent political players. People very often organize under ethnic banners such as "Bosnian Serbs" or "Abkhazis"—which can serve as stable political identities despite the variety of agendas they usually subsume. Indeed, as Fredrik Barth noted long ago, while the membership and content of ethnicities morph, unite, change, and divide, the *boundaries* that distinguish groups from one another remain remarkably robust over time.[63] Thus, just as policy analysts can speak meaningfully of the behavior of France or Britain in international affairs, one may also speak of the behavior of ethnic groups at the substate level whose political existence is a universally accepted, and therefore consequential, social fact.

This book does not seek to problematize "ancient ethnic hatreds" so widely believed to lie at the heart of sectarian conflict. This has already been accomplished, to my mind, by much of the recent scholarship in ethnic politics. The added value of this project lies instead in problematizing minority claim-making. Rather than taking the claims at face value, I advance and test a theory that group claims serve primarily as bargaining tools by which minority leaders extract concessions from their state centers. Their decision to employ this gambit is informed by their perceptions of relative power, which in turn are driven by perceptions of external support and institutional opportunities. By identifying the proximate triggers for radicalization and moderation, this model has lessons for managing communal conflict. Perhaps the most important implication for policy, however, is that ethnic conflicts are rarely ever completely extinguished, but instead remain a latent—and potentially explosive—schism at the domestic, regional, and global levels.

On the positive side, this also means that groups that pursue secession—even through violence—are rarely destined to adhere to such goals. The cases of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, the Catholics in Northern Ireland, and the Turks in Cyprus show that separatist organizations may assume a more integrationist stance when the strategic picture changes. Rather than aim for complete cures, peacemakers should therefore attempt to *contain* ethnic disputes at a level that permits constructive dialogue. It must also be remembered that communal cleavages rarely begin and end with the state, but extend to the wider region. It remains for major powers and international organizations to maintain equilibrium at the internal and regional levels as assiduously as that they manage disputes at the interstate level—by paying attention to what they signal to disempowered groups and by creating incentives for governments to de-ethnicize their institutions. Through it all, third party mediators should bear in mind Hippocrates' famous dictum to "make a habit of two things—to help, or at least to do no harm."

CHAPTER ONE

The Origins of Ethnic Bargaining

The contemporary discourse of ethnic bargaining combines Westphalian integrationist rights with a newer brand of segregationist rights born in the age of nationalism.[1] While there is no obvious link between the two discursive traditions, minority leaders can be seen to use them interchangeably in the course of bargaining with their centers. The ethnic bargaining framework thus serves as a kind of master "toolbox" containing all the devices available to minority elites in mobilizing popular challenges against their governments and attracting external support for their cause.[2] These devices have their origins in three distinct, yet overlapping, historical phases: (1) the post-Westphalian period of minority recognition; (2) the League of Nations era of minority protection; and (3) the post–World War II period of minority empowerment.[3] This chapter explores each period in turn, demonstrating how the actions of the leading world powers have contributed to the fitful, nonlinear development of this discourse over time.

Minority Recognition

Integrationist minority rights can be traced back at least as far as the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.[4] This treaty held, among other things, that the relations between rulers and their subjects could not be determined by outside powers. In return for the right to exercise absolute sovereignty over their territories, European monarchs promised to protect the rights of certain religious minorities in their domains. Reciprocal pledges of noninterference were thus traded for promises to recognize one another's minorities.[5] Although the Treaty of Westphalia is best known as the foundation of the modern state system, it also introduced the principle of minority rights into international law.[6]

Nearly two hundred years later, the Great Powers extended these rights to ethnic minorities. The 1815 Treaty of Vienna, which restored order to the continent in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, "included for the first time explicit protection for an ethnic as opposed to a religious group."[7] The treaty thus recognized the existence of a Polish nation, granting it a degree of autonomy on the basis of its national distinctiveness. In practice, however, minority recognition continued to take a backseat to realpolitik concerns: over the following decades, Prussia, Russia, and Austria abrogated Poland's autonomous arrangements as soon as they were perceived to threaten their interests.

The European powers gave another nod to minority rights in their treaties with the new states of southeast Europe in the late 1800s. In return for recognition, the agreements mandated that each fledgling state respect the rights of certain minorities within its territory. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin, for example, established explicit rights for the Turkish, Greek, and Romanian minorities residing in Bulgaria.[8] The 1881 International Convention of Constantinople included provisions for Muslims living in areas of Greek control, guaranteeing them the free exercise of Islam and the maintenance of Islamic courts.[9] These protections were driven less by humanitarian concerns than they were by realpolitik considerations—the European Powers wanted to ensure the stability of the Balkans and prevent the out-migration of disgruntled or persecuted minorities to Western Europe. The treaties were also sometimes used as a pretext for Great Power interventions aimed at securing their interests in the region. Where there were no vital interests at stake, a more limited "humanitarian intervention" might be undertaken through diplomatic channels.[10]

The spread of nationalism in the nineteenth century paved the way for grassroots mobilization around the perceived right to national self-determination. This principle—together with the examples of the French and American revolutions—had a particularly galvanizing effect on the Habsburg minorities, which felt themselves doubly oppressed by antinational imperial rule. Unlike earlier movements, the 1848 revolutions in east central Europe were motivated at least as much by nationalist discontent as they were by liberal democratic principles. The discourse of nationalism was also used to justify the unification of the Italian peninsula in 1860 and the German states in 1871.

It is important to note in this respect that Italy and Germany achieved sovereignty not because the international community had recognized their natural rights to statehood but because they were able to seize it through force. Similarly, Hungary was made an equal partner in the Dual Monarchy not because Austria had finally acknowledged the legitimacy of Hungarian claims to independence but because Vienna was desperate for powerful internal allies to counterbalance Prussia's rising power. The Austrians and Hungarians, in turn, granted autonomy to the second-ranking nationalities in their respective domains not out of a shared commitment to minority rights but because of their need for additional internal allies to counter accumulating threats to the empire. Although some European minorities achieved national independence during this period, most continued to endure political, cultural, and/or economic repression—including the Armenians and Jews in the Balkans, the Bretons and Corsicans in France, the Flemish in Belgium, the Alsatians in France, and the Irish in Great Britain.

Minority Protection

The end of World War I inaugurated the second developmental phase of ethnic bargaining. In a series of public speeches, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson popularized the nascent principle of national self-determination, claiming that "no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property."[11] This principle combined Enlightenment notions that the people should rule with the nineteenth-century belief that nations were "peoples," concluding that nations therefore had the right to self-government. Out of this admixture came the more controversial *segregationist* strand of rights, which holds that all nations are entitled to political independence.[12]

The idea that "every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live" was doubtless part of Wilson's worldview.[13] However, it is important to note that his outlook was also consistent with the widespread contemporary belief that the world was divided into a patchwork of nations and proto-nations that would someday grow up to be nation-states. Interestingly, the antinationalist Lenin also subscribed to this view, writing that "[t]he right of nations to self-determination means only the right to independence in a political sense, the right to free, political secession from the oppressing nation."[14]

Despite this high-flown rhetoric, self-determination was implemented only insofar as it furthered the interests of the victorious Allied Powers. Czechoslovakia and Poland were created in part to establish self-rule for the Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles, but mainly to check the regional ambitions of Germany, Austria, and Hungary. Thus, millions of ethnic Germans were obliged to remain in Poland and Czechoslovakia, two-thirds of Hungary's territory was given to neighboring states, the Germans of Alsace-Lorraine were attached to France, and the German Tyroleans were handed over to Italy—all clear violations of the principle of self-determination. Altogether, the postwar settlement placed almost 100 million people in new states; approximately 25 million were stranded outside their national homelands, including millions of Greeks, Turks, Germans, and Hungarians.[15] Practical exigencies had thus taken precedence over principles in determining the postwar boundaries.[16]

To prevent these inconsistencies from upsetting the peace settlement, the Allies established a system of minority protections under the new League of Nations. The regime consisted of five minorities treaties with the new states of east central Europe, four bilateral treaties with defeated powers, promises by other states to respect minority rights as a condition for gaining membership in the League, and special administrative arrangements for minority regions such as Danzig and Upper Silesia. The minority protections themselves ranged from the right to choose one's citizenship to guarantees of nondiscrimination. There were also provisions for minority schools, subsidies for minority cultural associations, and the right to use one's mother tongue in official business.[17]

Created to stabilize the postwar order, the regime inadvertently served as an early blueprint for today's ethnic bargaining framework. This is because the League system effectively internationalized minority protection. The treaties, for example, were to be taken as fundamental law by the signatory states and could not be contravened without the explicit consent of the League Council. If a government were suspected of violating its commitments under its treaty, council members could bring charges before the Permanent Court of International Justice, which had compulsory jurisdiction over such matters. Most important, the League provided a means by which nationalities could, for the first time, petition for legal redress over the heads of their governments.[18]

Ethnic minorities received a great deal of attention in the early years of the League. The first decade witnessed a rapid growth of minority legislation in the signatory states; monitoring and enforcement of the treaties also underwent significant expansion. As the number of minority petitions to the League mushroomed, a separate Minorities Department was created under the Secretariat to deal with the increased workload. Its staff more than doubled shortly after its inception, and the budget for the Minorities Section increased from 175,000 to over 333,000 Swiss francs over the first ten years.[19] By advocating tirelessly on behalf of group rights, the department also helped legitimize external minority protections in global public opinion.

Minority organizations soon began to use this nascent bargaining framework to mobilize against their governments. In the 1920s, they flooded the League Council with petitions for legal redress and assistance.[20] To attract international support for their cause, they also established a number of pan-European alliances. These include the Association of the German Racial Groups in Europe, the Warsaw Congress of Poles Living Abroad, the pan-Russian Congress in Riga, and the minority unions in Hungary. Minority leaders also formed domestic coalitions to leverage their position at the substate level—the association of National Minorities in Germany and the loose minority alliances in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland are examples of the latter arrangements.[21]

By the mid-1920s, minority rights were sufficiently legitimized in the global political discourse that groups began to challenge their governments openly in international fora. At the 1926 Congress of European Nationalities, for example, a representative of the German minority in Hungary proclaimed, "[W]e desire to participate not merely as objects but as subjects. . . . The only question is whether the law of nationalities is of international or of internal concern. Clearly it is a matter of international policy."[22] At the fifth Congress in 1929, a Sudeten German deputy declared ominously that "[t]he character of a minority suits us no longer. We regard ourselves rather as one of the governing people and demand political equality beyond that guaranteed by the Minorities Treaties. . . . It is our unshakeable resolve to bring about a revision of the present constitution."[23]

In the 1930s, the ethnic bargaining framework reverted from the international to the bilateral level, largely due to the declining influence of the League in world politics. From 1929 onward, the League Council devoted its resources to accommodating the intensifying demands of Germany and Hungary on behalf of their co-ethnics in neighboring countries, while ignoring the plight of truly beleaguered minorities.[24] When the League failed to respond to Poland's decision to withdraw from its treaty in 1934, the minorities system became a virtual dead letter. Observing these developments, minority representatives scaled back their petitions accordingly—the number of appeals submitted to the League Secretariat dropped from 204 in 1930 to 4 in 1938.[25]

A behavioral bifurcation now emerged between the weak and the strong minorities in Europe. Groups with no outside support—such as the Jews and the Roma (gypsies)—grew silent, whereas strong minorities with powerful lobby states—the Sudeten Germans and ethnic Hungarians—continued to ratchet up their claims against their hapless governments.[26] Citing national self-determination and the rights of German minorities, the Reich eventually expanded into central Europe, swallowing Austria and annexing large chunks of Czechoslovakia and Poland. At the same time, millions of Jews and Roma perished in concentration camps across Europe. Ethnic cleansing continued after the war as the governments of East Central Europe organized reprisals against the very German, Hungarian, and Croatian minorities they had earlier sought to accommodate. Under the Beneš Decrees, which were retroactively ratified by the Czechoslovak Provisional National Assembly in 1946, millions of Germans in Bohemia and Moravia were expelled from the Czech lands on charges of Nazi collaboration—as many as a quarter of a million were killed or executed in the process. In the Czech town of Ústí nad Labem, hundreds and perhaps even thousands of unarmed German civilians were shot or thrown off a bridge into the Elbe river.[27] Overall, at least 12 million ethnic Germans were driven out of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and prewar German territory after the war.[28] The Hungarians and Croats were also targeted for reprisals. In 1944, around 40,000 Hungarian civilians were tortured or summarily executed when Serb Partisans recaptured Vojvodina from the occupying Hungarian Army (see chapter 6). In the infamous Bleiburg massacre, tens of thousands of fleeing Croatian soldiers and civilians were slaughtered by the victorious Partisans after Allied forces had turned them back at the Austrian border.[29]

Minority Empowerment

World War II ultimately involved twenty-eight countries and numerous colonies, was fought in two theaters, and resulted in approximately 17 million battleground deaths.[30] Shocked by the unprecedented carnage, the victorious Allied Powers resolved that such a conflict would never be repeated and created the United Nations and other international institutions to consolidate the postwar order. Wary of collectivist ideologies, which Nazi Germany had used to justify territorial expansion, the framers omitted any mention of integrationist minority rights in the founding UN documents.[31]

Segregationist rights suffered a similar fate after the war. Not only did Britain and France renege on promises of independence that they had made to their wartime allies, but they also opposed establishing a general right to self-determination for fear of losing their overseas colonies.[32] In the end, the principle *was* included in the UN Charter; however, it was defined so narrowly as to render it practically meaningless. Article 1(2) of the charter mandated only that states grant as much self-government to their colonies and nationalities "as possible."[33] Achieving independence thus required the consent of the interested state or colonial government, affirming the overriding norm of sovereignty.

Despite these warning signs, a number of groups attempted to cash in on wartime pledges of sovereignty. In 1944, Uighur separatists in China established the Eastern Turkistan Republic, electing a president and designating a national flag.[34] In 1947, the Jurassians in Switzerland launched their own independence movement, appealing to the UN to support their cause. The following is an excerpt from their 1950 national anthem:

> If those who would thwart our independence
> choose to impose their rule in our valleys,
> Then let each of us lunge forward into battle
> and spread dismay among their ranks!
> Our past guides us along the path
> of a free people to the United Nations.[35]

The Nagas of India, too, proclaimed a sovereign Nagaland—on the eve of India's own declaration of independence.[36] Other groups that followed suit include the Kurds in Iran and Iraq; the Sikhs and Kashmiris in India; the Kachins, Karens, and Arakanese in Myanmar; the Azeris in Iran; the South Tyroleans and Sardinians in Italy; and the Pashtuns in Pakistan. Most of these movements were brutally suppressed by their central governments. Although some resistance leaders pleaded for external support, western governments proved generally unwilling to intervene on their behalf. When the Karen secessionists sought aid from the British, for example, they were advised to "throw [their] lot in with Myanmar." Shortly thereafter, the army arrested the leaders of the uprising, looting and pillaging Karen villages. The Nagas suffered a similar treatment at the hands of the Indian government—approximately 150,000 people died between 1954 and 1964 as a result of the crackdown.[37] Although the United Nations had promised the people of Kashmir and Jammu that they would be able to determine their own fate through a national plebiscite, it did not interfere when India and Pakistan instead divided the region between themselves in 1949. Other would-be separatists took their cue from these developments and moderated their demands in light of the meager support offered by the international community.

In the meantime, communist countries united with newly independent states in a protracted campaign to reinterpret Article 1(2) as a prohibition against colonial rule. After a long period of opposition—during which time colonialism gradually lost legitimacy as a practical and ethical form of government—Western governments finally joined the movement to de-colonize Africa and Asia. To facilitate the process, the UN General

Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960. The document asserted that "all peoples" had the right to self-determination and decreed that all "forms and manifestations" of colonialism be brought to an end.[38] Although the resolution was meant to apply to colonized peoples only,[39] it was not long before the success of de-colonization inspired minority organizations in sovereign states to use the principle of self-determination to challenge their national governments.

As the Cold War began to wind down, movements that had mobilized on the basis of class gradually changed their tactics in light of the decline of ideological conflict and the growing salience of self-determination. The Parti Quebecois began as a socialist movement against the economic dominance of the "200 [Anglo-Canadian] families" that supported discrimination against Francophones. By 1980, however, the Parti had become a movement for Quebecois secession.[40] Similarly, the native Hawaiian movement—which had originated as an economic campaign against the destruction of farmland—had by the 1990s "evolved into a larger struggle for native Hawaiian autonomy."[41] The Sri Lankan Tamil movement, too, was initially based on demands for social and economic justice—including the end of racial quotas in civil service employment and university admissions. The campaign escalated to demands for secession in the late 1970s. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) electoral platform of 1977 declared that "The Tamil nation must take the decision to establish its sovereignty in its homeland on the basis of its right to self-determination." It promised that if elected, TULF would gain the independence of Tamil Eelam "by peaceful means or by direct action or struggle."[42] The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey originally called for overthrowing *both* Turkish and Kurdish capitalists. The PKK Manifesto of 1978 pointed out that "the Kurdish feudal lords welcomed [Turkish exploitation of Kurds], since the limited exploitation offered to them under a feudal system was not sufficient."[43] By 1984, however, the PKK had begun to call for Kurdish sovereignty, accusing Turkey of destroying the Kurdish national identity through state-sponsored assimilation. Other groups that shifted their mobilizational frame from class to nationalism included the Kurds in Iraq, the Moros in the Philippines, the Assamese and Tripuras in India, and the West Papuans and Acehnese in Indonesia.

A behavioral bifurcation again appeared between the strong and the weak minorities. Whereas the leaders of territorially compact groups increasingly used segregationist rights to bargain with their governments, the representatives of territorially dispersed groups began to rally around integrationist rights. During the 1960s, UN principles of nondiscrimination combined with the example of the U.S. civil rights movement to mobilize disadvantaged minorities around the world.[44] The Aboriginals of Australia, for example, organized "freedom rides" into rural areas known for racial prejudice. They also wrote their own version of "We Shall Overcome," which was sung at protest rallies.[45] In Colombia, a political party that represented blacks self-consciously "base[d] its platform on its perception of the North American civil rights movement." A second "model[ed] its actions after the Black Islam and Black Panther movements of North America."[46] Allison Brysk writes:

> An international discourse of racial equality linked to the U.S. civil rights movement was filtering through Latin America; Brazilian Indians were apparently inspired by the North American Indian movement's 1973 protest at Wounded Knee. . . . [Meanwhile,] anthropologists and aid workers radicalized by the 1960's social movements . . . questioned the relationship between their enterprise and imperialism and used their positions to reach out to local populations.[47]

The 1970s witnessed a massive rise in the mobilization of indigenous communities and other marginalized minorities. Examples include indigenous groups in Panama, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Mexico, and Argentina; the Aboriginals in Australia; the Maoris in New Zealand; the Berbers in Algeria; the Assamese and Scheduled Tribes in India; the Biharis and Chittagong Hill Tribes in Bangladesh; and the Indians in Malaysia and Sri Lanka. The growth of minority activism was particularly striking in Central and South America, where indigenous congresses, coalitions, and federations formed at both the national and international levels to pressure their governments for concessions. Rodolfo Stavenhagen writes that "[i]n the 1960s, not more than a smattering of indigenous organizations existed; by the beginning of the 1990s, dozens of such groups have been identified as established and representative associations in every country. Hundreds probably exist continent-wide."[48] International advocacy networks assisted indigenous groups in negotiating with their governments over land, cultural, and linguistic rights as well as labor conditions. Meanwhile, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) convened high-profile conferences to draw international attention to the plight of indigenous communities, leveraging their power at the substate level.[49] Indigenous leaders responded to these political openings by seeking direct representation in international organizations and by articulating their demands in public fora as a means of attracting additional support for their cause.

The Zapatistas in Mexico have made particularly brilliant use of such tactics.[50] Zapatista Leader Subcommandante Marcos gained notoriety for staging theatrical events for the media as a means of improving the group's bargaining position vis-à-vis the Mexican government. At the end of the UN International Year of the World's Indigenous Peoples in 1993, the Zapatistas launched an uprising to broadcast their plight to the global community.[51] In 2001, Marcos led a March of Indigenous Dignity—modeled after the 1963 March on Washington—through Mexico's southern states and into Mexico City. Mexican President Vicente Fox responded to the outpouring of international sympathy in the wake of these maneuvers by scaling back the government's military presence in Chiapas and by releasing dozens of imprisoned rebels—a key demand of Zapatista leaders for reentering peace talks.[52]

Ethnic Bargaining in the Cyber-Age

The steady increase in minority mobilization around the world appears to have peaked in the early 1990s—mainly as the result of massive upheavals in the former East bloc. The collapse of communism and subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia led to dire predictions that nationalism would destabilize the entire Eurasian continent.[53] To prevent internecine warfare on their eastern frontiers, West European governments called for enhanced minority protections within existing state borders. In 1991, the European Community (EC) announced "a common position on the process of recognition" of new states, affirming the principle of self-determination and minority rights so long as they were exercised within "existing frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement."[54] Not surprisingly, these declarations did little to halt the dissolution of Yugoslavia—Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991 and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in 1992.

Patrick Thornberry observes that "[a]s the burgeoning number of entities revealed themselves, international organizations competed to 'do something about' minorities"; the 1992 UN Declaration on Minority Rights, for example, was ratified by the General Assembly in "the blink of an eyelid."[55] West European governments joined in the effort by creating institutions for conflict management and by expanding minority rights to placate restive minorities with irredentist kin states. In 1990, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE) adopted the Copenhagen Document, which committed signatory states to greater minority protections. Two years later, the OSCE established the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) to detect and resolve nascent ethnic conflicts within OSCE member states. In 1994, the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted the

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages as well as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities—the first legally binding instrument for enforcing minority rights on the international level. Under the Framework Convention, signatory states were required to report periodically to the CoE on the status of minorities within their borders.[56]

At the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the European Council established a set of objective standards that east Central European countries must meet in order to be admitted to the EU. These standards, which came to be known as the "Copenhagen criteria," include democratic stability, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the guaranteed protection of minorities. The EU's Association Agreements with several prospective member states also required them to recognize their minority nations.[57] Originally aimed at postcommunist Europe, these initiatives appear to have evolved into general instruments for minority protection. The overall effect has been, as Demetres Christopulos put it, to "emancipate minority rights from human rights"[58]—a step toward recognizing groups themselves as subjects in international law.

Segregationist rights, too, have enjoyed a renaissance since the end of the Cold War. Although Western governments have refrained from recognizing minority rights to territorial autonomy, several covenants have moved in that direction. Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty, for example, proclaimed that "[the European] Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member-states, while respecting their national and regional diversity."[59] Now Article 151 under the Amsterdam Treaty, it obliges the EU to support the development of minority regions throughout Europe. The Copenhagen Document, too, states that

> The participating States note the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain minorities by establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate *local and autonomous administrations* corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities.[60]

Even more dramatic is CoE Recommendation 1201, which asserts that—in addition to their own political parties, schools, and the free use of their mother tongue—national minorities also have the right to political autonomy. Article 11 states that "[i]n the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state."[61]

Minority representatives have responded to their discursive empowerment by invoking segregationist rights as a means of attracting external support and establishing the legitimacy of their cause. In a rare personal interview conducted during the Bosnian War, General Ratko Mladić, commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, asserted that the Serbs had an historic claim to the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina: "We just want the international community, if the Muslims and Croats are given the right to [create a] federation or confederation, to recognize the same right of the Serb people to be on our own land with our own people. We are not creating our country in Asia or America or Africa; we're just doing so on our ancestors' land."[62]

The Chechen separatists, too, have used the discourse of minority and human rights to gain outside support for their resistance. On April 16, 1996, the *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* published a direct appeal from Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev "calling on the peoples of the G7 states, the Vatican, the Islamic world, and all upholders of human rights and freedoms, not to let the G7 summit take place in Moscow in April while there [are] still Russian troops in Chechnya."[63] Chechen leaders have repeatedly requested OSCE mediation and UN intervention to help resolve the conflict and thereby achieve independence for the region. In the mid-1990s, Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia used *both* the CoE Recommendation 1201 and the Framework Convention to justify their demands for local self-government.

Technological advances in the 1990s have also contributed to minority empowerment. The spread of Internet, satellite, and wireless technologies have facilitated the growth of transnational networks used to mobilize logistical and financial support for autonomy struggles in remote locations.[64] According to Jeff Delisio, webmaster for the Free Tibet Home Page, "[t]here is an effort underway now to improve the online services in Dharamsala, the home of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. This will enable a more direct link between Tibet supporters and the officials and organizations where the bulk of Tibetans reside."[65] Indeed, it is through increased access to the global media that Tenzin Gyatso, the fourteenth Dalai Lama, was able to organize the international Free Tibet movement in the 1990s.

The Native Hawaiian movement, too, gathered momentum via the Internet with numerous websites dedicated to the pursuit of Hawaiian sovereignty. These include weblinks to legal documents, historical accounts of the native people, and contact information for key international organizations and U.S. representatives who may be lobbied for support. The campaign provided impetus for the Apology Bill that was passed by Congress in 1993 to apologize for the illegal U.S. annexation of the Hawaiian kingdom in 1893. For its part, the Hawaiian state government passed legislation in the mid-1990s to promote the development of a "Hawaiian Nation." The U.S. departments of State, Justice, and the Interior also began to negotiate with the Hawaiian government over arrangements for Native Hawaiian autonomy.[66]

Taken together, these developments have helped create what has been called the "Fourth World," a self-conscious community of "[n]ations forcibly incorporated into states which maintain a distinct political culture but are internationally unrecognized."[67] This informal alliance of unrecognized nations has gained momentum in cyberspace, inspiring new independence movements and magnifying the voices of old ones. They sometimes even work in concert. One of the most visible efforts to bargain collectively is the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO), which was established in 1991 as a kind of "shadow United Nations" for aspiring nation-states. Like the UN, the UNPO has a founding covenant, a general assembly, and a secretary general. According to its homepage, the UNPO is

> an international organization created by nations and peoples around the world who are not represented as such in the world's principal international organizations. . . . The UNPO offers an international forum for occupied nations, indigenous peoples, minorities, and even oppressed majorities . . . [empowering] them to represent themselves more effectively.[68]

Its other activities notwithstanding, a central aim of the UNPO has been to obtain statehood for its member nations. Six of its founding members—Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Palau—have since been inducted into the United Nations—a goal to which many UNPO members aspire. In 2005, the UNPO represented over 60 nations and peoples with over 150 million people—ranging from the Cabindans in Angola to the Chins in Myanmar to the Kosovar Albanians in Yugoslavia. The UNPO homepage also contains links to its member websites—each of which displays a self-styled flag and country name, a description of its independence struggle, and relevant UN documents. There are also links to advocacy organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as well as offices of the U.S. Congress, the UN, and the EU.[69]

UNPO lobbying has helped raise the visibility of marginalized groups. Pitching one's cause to powerful states and international organizations has also prepared separatist leaders for international diplomacy in the unlikely event that they *do* obtain sovereignty. This has occurred in a few cases. When NATO countries began to negotiate with the Yugoslav government on behalf of Kosovar Albanians in 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—

previously blacklisted by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization—obtained de facto diplomatic recognition in the West as the legitimate representative of the Kosovar Albanians. The independence leaders of East Timor, a former UNPO member, received unexpected international support when José Ramos Horta—a prominent champion of East Timorese independence—was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. Fretilin Leader José António Amorim Dias later recalled: "Before the peace prize, we would visit embassies and they would send out the number two or three. Now [their] doors are open to us."[70] In a letter dated April 20, 2002, East Timor's newly established Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited the UNPO to its independence celebrations. The letter reads in part:

> Dear Friends at UNPO Netherlands,
> It is our greatest pleasure to let you know that East Timor will become an independent nation on 20 May 2002. This day marks the culmination of a courageous and inspiring quest by the people of East Timor, and the birth of a new nation. At the same time, it is an opportunity to acknowledge the remarkable contribution, over many years, of our friends in the NGO and Solidarity Movement around the world and the international community in general to this endeavour, and to recognise their continuing willingness to assist.[71]

Equally important, transnational networks have enabled minority organizations to identify potential allies whose interests intersect—however fleetingly—with their own. Since the 1990s, many secessionist movements have made common cause with Islamic fundamentalist groups, as seen in the involvement of the Afghani mujahideen in the Bosnian Muslim and Kosovar Albanian struggles for independence. In the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf group was grafted onto the Moros separatist movement by Islamic radicals returning from the Afghan war.[72] In Kashmir, too, the flagging secessionist movement regained momentum with the infiltration of two Islamic fundamentalist groups supported by Pakistan, Pakistani emigrants, and Arab governments and charities in the Gulf. Jason Burke writes of the Kashmiri insurgency,

> When the first demonstrations had started back in 1987, the Kashmiri grievances were largely articulated within a contemporary Western human rights discourse, albeit with a religious and economic undercurrent. The only Islamic activists seriously involved believed in a gradualist political Islam. Seven years later the insurgency had become dominated by the most violent fringe of modern Islamic activism.[73]

Thus, in the same way that they mobilized under the banner of class to gain backing from the U.S. or the USSR during the Cold War, today's secessionist organizations have increasingly adopted the discourse of radical Islam to attract resources from transnational Islamic networks. The growing ease with which loose and/or temporary alliances can now be forged with other nonstate actors represents a novel source of leverage against the state. These actors include diaspora groups, private charities, corporations, advocacy organizations, and secessionist movements in other states—any of which can act as a surrogate kin state to minority organizations seeking to challenge their host government.

Data Analysis: Minority Mobilization in the Postwar Period

A descriptive analysis of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set shows a steady rise in minority mobilization since World War II. Figure 1.1 plots the number of *newly* mobilized groups for every five-year period since 1945.[74] A large number of new contenders emerged immediately after World War II, and another large cluster appeared at the close of the Cold War—suggesting that massive political change creates opportunity structures for groups to mobilize collectively for the first time. The largest share of first-time mobilizers in the early postwar years was in sub-Saharan Africa. At the time, European colonial powers were just beginning to retrench from the continent. This fatally weakened their client regimes, paving the way for indigenous groups to challenge their centers over territory or government power. In the



Figure 1.1 Number of newly mobilized groups for each five-year period since 1945

early 1990s, the bulk of newly mobilized groups was concentrated in Eastern Europe, as minority leaders responded to strategic openings created by the collapse of Soviet power to advance claims against their state centers.

Figure 1.2 shows that most of the new mobilizers in the immediate postwar period were powerful groups such as ethnonationalists (large, concentrated groups with a distinctive identity and history of autonomy) and communal contenders (groups competing for control of the central government). In contrast, most new contenders in the 1990s were relatively weak groups, including national minorities (small groups usually well-integrated in the majority society) and ethnoclasses (economically advantaged or disadvantaged ethnic groups).[75] This pattern might be explained by the fact that integrationist minority rights became an influential discursive opportunity structure only after the 1960s, when the U.S. civil rights movement inspired weak groups around the world to mobilize collectively for the first time. Both figures show that the number of new contenders declined sharply at the end of the twentieth century as postcommunist states began to consolidate, thereby narrowing strategic openings at the substate level.

Figures 1.3 and 1.4 depict the *cumulative* number of mobilized minorities for every five-year period since World War II. These figures show a rise in the overall number of mobilized groups since 1945, replicating the findings of Ted Gurr.[76] Although only 67 minorities were politically active in the late 1940s, this number had risen to 230 by the late 1990s. There are two main reasons for this cumulative increase. First, empirical evidence



Figure 1.2 Number of newly mobilized groups by type for each five-year period

shows that, once mobilized, groups tend to stay mobilized.[77] The overall number of politically active minorities thus increases over time as new contenders appear on the scene. Second, the growing salience of integrationist rights and the increased activism of international advocacy networks in the 1970s and 1980s mobilized many marginalized groups, including indigenous communities in South America and foreign workers in continental Europe.



Figure 1.3 Total number of politically active groups by region



Figure 1.4 Total number of politically active groups by type

Figure 1.4 breaks down the cumulative number of mobilized groups by type. The greatest increases in the total number of mobilized groups can be seen among indigenous groups, national minorities, and ethnoclasses. The number of politically active indigenous groups increased steadily from twelve in the late 1940s to sixty-three in the late 1990s; the number of mobilized national minorities increased from five in the 1940s to thirty-eight in the late 1990s (with the greatest jump in the late 1980s). Finally, the number of politically active ethnoclasses quadrupled from a mere six in the late 1940s to twenty-four in the late 1990s. Such quantum leaps cannot be observed among more powerful groups such as ethnonationalists and communal contenders. This confirms the hypothesis that the steady rise in minority mobilization over the postwar period is driven largely by the increased activism of weaker minorities, which obtained critical leverage from enhancements in the contemporary bargaining framework.

Prior to the twentieth century, the interests of minorities were unambiguously subordinated to those of powerful states and empires. Despite this, the Great Powers established the foundation for integrationist minority rights in a succession of peace treaties used to reconfigure political boundaries in the wake of European wars. The League of Nations regime altered the relationship between states and groups in two important ways. First, the post–World War I European borders were justified on the basis of national self-determination, according to which recognized nations have the right to self-government. This norm gradually evolved into the more controversial strand of segregationist rights, which are used by minority movements today to challenge their host governments. Second, the interwar minorities regime established a mechanism by which group representatives could appeal for legal redress over the heads of their governments. Minority organizations responded to this institutional opportunity structure by flooding the League with petitions for international intervention. They also formed alliances at the substate and transnational levels to leverage their position against their state centers. In these and other ways, minorities used the nascent bargaining framework in the interwar era to launch significant challenges against their governments. Both integrationist and segregationist minority rights fell out of favor in the immediate postwar period due to Nazi Germany's subversive use of collective rights in the 1930s. However, segregationist rights were revived in the 1960s to facilitate the process of de-colonization in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, integrationist rights were given a push in the postwar years by UN working groups, the international human rights campaign, and the U.S. civil rights movement.

The leaders of ethnic groups around the world have responded to these emerging opportunity structures by self-consciously wedding their struggles to the discourse of self-determination and minority rights. The late twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented rise in the number of groups whose representatives were actively bargaining with their host governments over state resources. The post–Cold War alliance of stateless nations known as the UNPO is further indication of this trend as, increasingly, the leaders of smaller and weaker groups advance demands for collective benefits. Minority empowerment has yielded undeniably positive developments, particularly for weak minorities in rich democracies and for indigenous communities whose standards of living have risen as a consequence. However, there has also been a growing trend among the leaders of territorially compact and externally leveraged minorities to escalate their claims against the center—very often leading to ethnic violence and sometimes even reprisals. This is the paradox of minority empowerment. The following chapter describes how the bargaining framework operates on the *micro*-level to produce fluctuations in group claims in individual cases, often in the absence of clear economic or security imperatives.

CHAPTER TWO

The Theory of Ethnic Bargaining

This chapter sets forth the micro-level dynamics of ethnic bargaining. In doing so, it addresses two empirical puzzles in minority politics. First, why do group leaders variously radicalize and moderate their demands against the state center over time? As noted in the introduction, relatively static features such as historical grievances, cultural differences, and underlying economic disparities cannot account for sudden shifts in the claims put forward by minority representatives. Second, contrary to the expectations of ethnic fears accounts, why do minorities sometimes mobilize when security threats diminish but *fail* to mobilize when they intensify?[1]

The theory of ethnic bargaining seeks to account for both puzzles. I begin with the observation that nationalist conflicts very often take the form of a territorially concentrated minority challenging the state center over collective benefits. Not uncommonly, such disputes also involve one or more external actors that provide aid to the rebelling minority. This strategic configuration bears a first-order resemblance to Rogers Brubaker's model of triadic relations between a national minority, a nationalizing state, and an external national homeland (see fig. 2.1).[2]

According to Brubaker, ethnic conflict occurs as political elites compete for dominance within each of these three "relational fields." The emergence of a radical stance in one field leads to the emergence of a radical stance in the other two fields, and vice versa. Conflict is thus a "contingent" outcome of the "interplay of mutually suspicious, mutually monitoring, mutually misrepresenting political elites," producing a cycle of radicalization that often leads to violence. However ingenious this is as a description of



Figure 2.1 The players

ethnic conflict, Brubaker's model is theoretically indeterminate. Because the relational fields are mutually constituted, his theory predicts neither when radicalization is likely to occur nor when a spiral of radicalization is likely to reverse itself. As Brubaker himself acknowledges, "what could not be predicted in these or other cases . . . was just what kind of nationalizing stance, what kind of minority self-understanding, what kind of homeland politics would prevail in the struggles . . . and just how the interplay between the three fields would develop."[3] The ethnic bargaining theory builds on this model by enhancing its predictive capacity.

The Theory of Ethnic Bargaining

The first thing to note is that minority mobilization is a necessary condition for the emergence of ethnic conflict. To see why, imagine what would happen if state authorities target a minority for abuse but the minority does not radicalize. Repression or genocide might result but not sectarian conflict as such. Thus, the extermination of millions of Jews in the Holocaust and the massacre of over one million Armenians by the Ottomans during World War I can be considered genocides but not ethnic conflicts, which imply a two-sided struggle. Now consider a case in which an external actor sends in troops on behalf of a group but, again, the group chooses not to radicalize. Interstate skirmishes or war would be the likely outcome but not minority-majority conflict as such. Minority mobilization is therefore the sine qua non of intergroup conflict and therefore serves as the logical focus of our investigation.

I measure minority radicalization as the extremity of collective demands that minority representatives advance against the center.[4] A group can be said to "make" a particular demand if it is put forward by the party or political leader who enjoys broad support within the minority rank and file. In the context of ethnic bargaining, group claims serve primarily as indicators of state challenge and may be ordered along a continuum of challenge ranging from affirmative action to secession or irredentism. Secession (establishing sovereignty over a portion of state territory) and irredentism (annexation of a portion of state territory by another state) represent the most extreme demands on the continuum; this is because they challenge the integrity of the state itself. Demands for territorial autonomy are less extreme because they call for devolution of state power to minority regions but do not challenge the external borders of the state. Claims of cultural or linguistic autonomy are more moderate still because they call for power-sharing in the spheres of culture and education while leaving unchallenged majority control over the state's politico-territorial institutions. Claims of affirmative action are the least extreme of all because they merely call for greater minority integration into the majority-controlled society (see fig. 2.2).

There is empirical justification for placing group claims on such a continuum. As Donald Horowitz notes, "Groups . . . are not born irredentist or secessionist. They can and do move back and forth from integrated participation in the state of which they are a part to a posture of secession or irredentism."[5] In the course of politicking, minority leaders routinely shift their demands up and down this spectrum to indicate relative radicalization and moderation, respectively. To illustrate, when group representatives abandon calls for territorial autonomy in favor of demands for language



Figure 2.2 Dependent variable: Extremity of minority demands

rights, they signify that the group has de-radicalized its challenge against the state. If, instead, they discard calls for territorial autonomy in favor of secession or irredentism, the group has intensified its challenge. The impetus for these shifts comes mainly from the rank and file, as minority members rally around elites whose claims reflect the perceived power differential between the minority and majority at every point in time.[6]

A number of scholars have already drawn attention the strategic uses of group demands. Donald Rothchild pointed out long ago that minority claims are a part of normal politicking in inter-ethnic societies as groups pursue a more favorable distribution of state resources. In this view, claim-making is not a zero-sum proposition, but rather a routine feature of collective bargaining at the substate level.[7] In his work on post-Soviet Russia, Steven Solnick, too, writes that struggles between the center and periphery constitute an "ongoing bargaining game over the ultimate distribution of powers in the future state."[8] Using a game theoretical model similar to the one set forth below, Rupen Cetinyan concludes that "[s]tronger groups—stronger either because of their independent means or because of those made available through the aid of an outside supporter—should demand, and get, more."[9] All of this suggests that minority demands are less important for what they are than for what they represent from a bargaining perspective.

But why do minorities mobilize around collective demands in the first place? Given that they are usually in a position of weakness vis-à-vis their state governments, mobilization is often a risky proposition. The decision to radicalize must therefore be driven by perceptions of increased power relative to the center. The question then emerges: How do these perceptions come about? On the most basic level, beliefs about minority leverage are a function of structural characteristics, including group size and territorial compactness. These features are both transparent and relatively static and therefore serve as base indicators of group strength.[10] As such, they effectively place limits on the extremity of claims that group leaders may credibly advance against the government. Group traits, however, tell only part of the story. Although size and compactness place limits on a minority's capability—and therefore willingness—to challenge the majority, they cannot predict when (or even if) a minority will radicalize. To explain shifts in demands over time, it is therefore necessary to bracket group traits in order to investigate the influence that nationalist signaling has on minority behavior.

Figure 2.3 illustrates the logic of ethnic bargaining. The minority has the first move for two reasons. First, intergroup conflict is usually initiated when the minority decides to challenge the domestic status quo. Second, due to its strategic vulnerability, the minority is the only player in the game to choose its actions on the basis of the anticipated responses of the other two play-



Player Preferences

Minority	**Majority**	
Concessions	Repression	Switch if majority is nonrepressive
Liberal society	Liberal society	
Repression	War	Switch if lobby actor is supportive
War	Concessions	

Figure 2.3 Decision tree of ethnic bargaining

ers. In contrast, the other actors (usually state governments or organizations) make decisions based on a variety of goals and inputs—which may or may not involve the minority. These include winning the support of their domestic constituents, satisfying powerful interest groups, obtaining trade preferences or international loans, and securing access to scarce resources. Rarely do these powerful players consider the likely minority response to their actions when making their choice.[11] Stephen Saideman provides empirical support for this proposition, showing that Serbia's inconsistent support for the Bosnian Serbs in the 1990s was driven more by domestic political considerations than it was by the needs of its ethnic kin over the border.[12]

Other data analyses indicate that third parties generally do not intervene to "rescue" their co-ethnics, but rather to serve their own geopolitical interests—to gain valuable territory or access to oil or water.[13] Nazi Germany, for example, invaded Bohemia and Moravia not so much to protect its co-ethnics, but rather to expand into central Europe. The host government, too, bases its policies on a wide range of goals. The Slovak government, for example, enacted more liberal minority policies in the late 1990s primarily due to its desire to join the EU.[14]

In light of these empirical regularities, the preferences of both the lobby actor and majority are treated as exogenous to the game. The minority thus begins each round of ethnic bargaining, choosing its action on the basis of the expected responses of the other two players. How does the minority anticipate their reactions? It does so by inferring their preferences from their signals of behavioral intent. On the most basic level, the minority is attempting to determine whether the state majority is repressive (R) or nonrepressive (~R) and whether its lobby actor (assuming one exists) is supportive (S) or nonsupportive (~S).[15]

Figure 2.4 depicts the combinations of these types, yielding four possible states of the world: conflict, opportunity, vulnerability, and peace. The minority's behavior largely depends on which state of the world it believes it is in.[16]

Lobby Actor	**Majority**: Repressive	**Majority**: Nonrepressive
Supportive	1 **State of Conflict** The minority radicalizes, risking inter-ethnic conflict	2 **State of Opportunity** The minority radicalizes, receiving concessions
Nonsupportive	3 **State of Vulnerability** The minority accommodates suffering repression	4 **State of Peace** The minority accommodates, facilitating inter-ethnic cooperation

Figure 2.4 Minority behavior in four states of the world

1. In the *state of conflict,* the lobby actor has both the incentive and capacity to intervene on behalf of the group; at the same time, the majority favors ethnic discrimination. The minority therefore expects repression if it accommodates the majority. If the group instead radicalizes, it expects its lobby actor to intervene on its side. To avoid confrontation, the majority will then back down and grant the minority concessions. Because the group prefers concessions to repression, it will radicalize to obtain benefits. The danger in this state of the world is that the audience costs to a nationalistic majority of backing down may come to outweigh the benefits of avoiding war, even with the risk of a humiliating defeat. If the minority is unaware of these calculations, it may radicalize to obtain concessions but instead find itself locked into war. Consequently, this combination of types is most likely to lead to intergroup (and even interstate) warfare.
2. In the *state of opportunity,* the minority is in an optimal bargaining position. This is because the majority prefers making concessions to the minority in order to reap the rewards of ethnic harmony. The minority, for its part, enjoys the support of an external lobby actor. The group therefore has a choice between two attractive alternatives. If the group accommodates the majority, the center will refrain from repression, yielding a liberal society. If the minority instead radicalizes, the majority will offer concessions to avoid a confrontation with the group's lobby actor. Because the minority prefers concessions to a liberal society, it will choose to radicalize to obtain rewards.
3. In the *state of vulnerability,* the minority is in the least advantageous bargaining position. Because the majority prefers exploitation to a liberal society, the minority can expect oppression if it accommodates the majority. If it instead radicalizes, the group faces annihilation due to its lack of external patronage. It therefore has a choice between the lesser of two evils. Because it prefers repression to the devastating costs of military defeat, the minority will accommodate the majority and suffer repression. However, the minority is likely to remain mobilized in this state of the world, even if its weakness deters it from overtly challenging the center.
4. In the *state of peace,* there is the greatest potential for inter-ethnic cooperation. This is because the majority prefers a liberal society to minority exploitation. If the minority accommodates the center, it therefore expects ethnic peace. At the same time, the minority has no external leverage with which to extract concessions from the center. Because there are no expected benefits to radicalization, the minority will accommodate the majority, yielding ethnic peace.

Inferring the Likely State of the World

In choosing whether to radicalize, the minority must first ascertain which of the four states of the world prevails. To make things even trickier, the majority and lobby actor preferences toward the minority can change suddenly due to economic shocks, changes in the government, shifts in public opinion, or interest group pressures. In contrast, the preferences of the minority remain relatively stable because it must focus narrowly on ensuring its own survival. The minority is therefore constantly monitoring the other two players for changes in their respective intentions. Because the host state and lobby actor have incentives to misrepresent their preferences, the minority must *infer* these preferences from signals of behavioral intent. Signals are signs—both intentional and unintentional—that communicate a set of preferences.[17] The minority uses these signals to update its beliefs concerning the preferences of the other two players and therefore the prevailing state of the world; the more credible the signal (e.g., the more it commits the majority or lobby actor to a particular set of actions), the more certain the minority is concerning the state of the world. If the minority believes the state of the world has changed, it may alter its behavior accordingly. Because it is continually updating its beliefs concerning the state of the world, the group can be expected to mobilize sporadically so that a society once riven by ethnic violence becomes a model of ethnic cohabitation, and vice versa.

Equilibrium Behavior in an Uncertain World

I use the decision tree in figure 2.3 to show how a minority might act in light of its uncertainty about the state of the world. I do this by comparing the minority's expected utility over two possible actions: radicalization versus accommodation. The expected value of each action is a weighted sum of the values of all the possible outcomes of that action multiplied by their respective probabilities of occurrence. The minority's expected utility of radicalization is thus:

$$\mathrm{EU_m(RAD)} = p_2\mathrm{Con} + (1 - p_2)\mathrm{War} \tag{1}$$

In words, the value to the minority of radicalizing is equal to the value of concessions multiplied by the probability that it has a supportive lobby actor plus the value of war weighted by the probability that it has an *un*supportive lobby actor. Similarly, the group's expected utility of accommodation is:

$$\mathrm{EU_m(ACC)} = p_1\mathrm{Rep} + (1 - p_1)\mathrm{Lib} \tag{2}$$

This is a weighted sum of the value to the minority of repression multiplied by the probability that the majority is repressive plus the value of a liberal society multiplied by the probability that the majority is nonrepressive. The minority can be expected to radicalize when its expected value of radicalization outweighs its expected value of accommodation:

$$p_2\text{Con} + (1 - p_2)\text{War} > p_1\text{Rep} + (1 - p_1)\text{Lib} \tag{3}$$

Thus, as the likelihood that its lobby actor is supportive (p_2) increases, the probability of obtaining concessions through radicalization also increases. This raises the expected utility of radicalization (the left side of the equation). Meanwhile, as the probability that the majority is repressive (p_1) increases, the likelihood of suffering repression if the group accommodates likewise increases. This lowers the minority's expected utility of accommodation (the right side of the equation).

By assigning concrete values to the preference orderings in figure 2.3 (Concessions = 4; Liberal society = 3; Repression = 2; and War = 1), we can solve for the critical probabilities p_1 and p_2 above which the minority is likely to radicalize regardless of what the majority does. As we see in figure 2.5, as the probability of outside support increases, the likelihood of repression must *decrease* for the group to continue to value accommodation. Strikingly, this diagram also suggests that:

(H_1) If the minority is certain that it *lacks* outside support, then it is likely to accommodate the majority, even if it knows that the majority is repressive.



Figure 2.5 Comparative statics of minority behavior

In contrast, if the minority is certain that the majority is *non*repressive, it may still radicalize as long as the estimated probability of outside support is at least two-thirds. This leads to the second hypothesis:

(H_2) If the minority is reasonably confident of outside support, it is likely to radicalize, even if it knows that the majority is nonrepressive.

These hypotheses imply that external actors have a greater impact on minority behavior than host governments. From a policy standpoint, this means that minority protections on the domestic level may be insufficient for resolving an internal conflict if external sources of minority leverage are not first neutralized.

The Spatial Model: Elections and Political Coalitions

I now introduce a spatial model to illustrate the effects that ethnic bargaining has on electoral politics in the host state. Multi-ethnic democracies contain both active and latent political cleavages. Two of the most salient cleavages, class and ethnicity, are represented graphically in figure 2.6. A central assumption in this model is that voters in divided societies have a fixed amount of political capital that they can invest in agents



Figure 2.6 Electoral politics in divided societies

who represent their ethnic interests, their economic interests, or some combination thereof. There is thus an implied trade-off between the two issue areas. To win popular support and thereby weaken their competitors, office-seeking minority and majority elites adopt stances that reflect the median preferences of their respective constituencies. These preferences are driven, at least in part, by collective perceptions concerning the prevailing state of the world. In addition to these "opportunistic" elites, there may also be "extremist" elites whose comparative advantage lies almost solely in the dimension of ethnicity or who are personally committed to radical postures—whether or not they resonate with the public. With this in mind, I hypothesize that:

> (H_3) Elites who vary their stances over time in response to changes in ethnic salience are likely to maintain power in divided societies; in contrast, those who retain exclusivist positions despite changes in ethnic salience are likely to fall in and out of political favor.

What determines the level of ethnic salience in divided societies? With respect to ethnic bargaining, the salience of ethnicity can be expected to rise when a minority's host government and/or lobby actor send credible signals of nationalist intent. If, for example, the host government and lobby actor are engaged in a conflict over the minority's status, individuals will be more likely to mobilize on an ethnic basis. Elites respond to the heightened ethnic salience by emphasizing ethnic issues in their political campaigns and public addresses and by forging intra-ethnic alliances. At the same time, inter-ethnic coalitions are likely to fracture as they lose political value. If the host government and lobby actor later drop the minority issue in an effort to normalize diplomatic or trade relations, they have credibly signaled their non-nationalist intent. Politics will then *de*-ethnicize as individuals conclude that their political capital is better invested in other issue areas. Elites respond by forming coalitions across ethnic boundaries to lobby more effectively for these other interests. This yields the following hypothesis for proportional representation (PR) systems of government:

> (H_4) When the minority's host government and/or lobby actor signal nationalist intent, political elites are likely to form intra-ethnic coalitions at the domestic level. If the two major players instead normalize relations, inter-ethnic coalitions are more likely to develop.

This suggests that ethnic cleavages fade rather than disappear as ethnic bargaining de-politicizes and re-politicizes ethnicity over time. Political alignments are thus in constant flux as individuals shift their political capital from one cleavage to the next. It may be, however, that an extended period of non-nationalist signaling will lead an ethnic cleavage to disappear from politics altogether. The evidence in chapter 5 suggests that this may have already happened in the case of the Moravians in former Czechoslovakia.

Research Design

I use the following proxies to test the predictions of ethnic bargaining. I measure minority radicalization as the claims made by political agents who (1) won the plurality of the minority vote in the most recent local or national elections and/or (2) are recognized as the de facto leaders of the group. The claims advanced by these representatives will serve as a moving indicator of the claims supported by the group. Whenever possible, public opinion polls are used to check the validity of this measure. Host government and lobby actor signals are measured as credible signs of policy intent that emanate from the governing officials of these bodies. In order of credibility, these include:

1. *Treaties/pacts.* Binding treaties or pacts are highly credible signals of behavioral intent because they are difficult to reach and costly to violate. By entering into these agreements, the signatories thus credibly commit to adhere to the guidelines set forth in these covenants. The most credible of these include mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement.
2. *Actions/policies.* Although not legally binding, official policies are also a reliable sign of behavioral intent—not only because actions speak louder than words, but also because they are costly signals to send and, once in place, commit a state or organization to a future set of actions. The minority rank and file may infer shifts in host state and lobby actor preferences by observing shifts in their policies.
3. *Public statements.* Public statements are the least credible signs of intent. Because they are cheap to make, they may be little more than empty rhetoric or bluffing devices. Official statements have *some* credibility, however, given that governments or organizations might incur audience costs by reneging on their publicly stated commitments.

Finally, I measure ethnic salience as the extent to which individuals in a society rally around elites—either minority or majority—who assume a hostile position toward the other ethnic group. Domestic coalitions are considered inter-ethnic if mainstream minority and majority representatives engage in political cooperation, particularly if they do so in government. They are considered *intra*-ethnic if there is cooperation within, but not between, minority and majority parties.

At this point, several caveats should be made with regard to the theory of ethnic bargaining. First, I do not argue that individual leaders play *no* significant role in the process of ethnic mobilization. Obviously, it is government leaders who enact repressive policies and the heads of lobby states and organizations who initiate ethnic interventions. Particularly where they can restrict access to independent sources of information, elites can (and often do) succeed in inducing the collective belief that mobilizing along ethnic cleavages will yield the greatest benefits (or the least costs). New democracies are especially vulnerable to nationalist myth-making because opportunistic leaders can exploit their partial monopolies over the media to whip up support for nationalist causes as a means of holding onto power during transition.[18] However, the ability of *minority* elites to play the ethnic card is far more circumscribed due to their limited institutional power as well as the constraints imposed upon them by the group's strategic vulnerability. The argument in this book relates primarily to minority leaders, whose positions are driven primarily from the ground up.

Second, I do not dispute that elites use ethnicity instrumentally to advance their private interests; indeed, I *assume* that political leaders are opportunistic insofar as they seek political power. However, notice that this character flaw—if one can call it that—does not logically predict ethnic extremism; something else must be present in order for ethnic appeals to resonate with the wider population. The ethnic bargaining model addresses this gap by identifying the *conditions* under which radicalism pays political dividends to opportunistic leaders.

Third, it may be objected that host state and lobby actor signals are indeterminate given the contradictory messages and competing voices that emanate from these bodies. However, the minority rank and file generally focus their attention on the recognized *leaders* of these bodies, rather than on peripheral players, for the obvious reason that the intentions of the governing officials are far more likely to be reflected in future policies. This simple rule is used to separate the wheat from the chaff in determining reliable signals of behavioral intent.

Finally, one might question the value of the model for explaining internal conflicts where there are no external lobbyists. In these cases, however, the model simply reduces to a dyadic bargaining game between the minority and majority. In a triadic configuration, minority radicalization is the result of fluctuations in *both* internal and external group leverage. In a dyadic configuration, radicalization is a function of shifts in internal leverage only. Minority size and territorial compactness still serve as preexisting structural determinants of internal leverage, placing limits on the extremity of demands that can be feasibly sought by the group. Fluctuations in mobilization, however, are driven by changes in the *relative power balance* between the group and the center. If the host government is weakened by severe economic recession, civil unrest, or foreign military campaigns, the minority may infer that it is relatively strong vis-à-vis the center and radicalize its demands as a means of obtaining greater concessions.

To conduct this analysis, I divide the seven cases of minority-majority relations into time segments, each of which represents a shift in the demands advanced by minority leaders. I examine these segments in turn to determine whether each shift in claims was preceded by signals from the host government or lobby actor in the direction predicted by ethnic bargaining. If, for example, a bilateral treaty between the minority's host and lobby states is followed closely by a moderation in the minority's demands, this provides support for the bargaining theory. To test the spatial model, I examine periods of inter-ethnic coalitioning to see whether they were preceded by credible signals of non-nationalist intent from both the host government and the lobby actor.

Chapters 4–6 apply joint longitudinal-comparative analysis to paired cases of minority-majority relations to test the explanatory power of ethnic bargaining relative to alternative theories of claim-making; it is also used to test more specific hypotheses concerning the relative influence of the lobby actor and host state on minority radicalization. In doing so, I compare cases that are similar in nearly every relevant respect except the key condition of interest, which is allowed to vary. If this variance is matched by variance in the dependent variable in the manner predicted by ethnic bargaining, this would tend to confirm the theory. I thus combine controlled comparison with longitudinal analysis as a means of addressing the small *N*–many variable problem that plagues qualitative research.[19]

Figure 2.7 shows how longitudinal and comparative analyses are combined to achieve greater control over potentially confounding variables. Thus the vertical axis represents variation in minority behavior over time while the horizontal axis represents variation in minority behavior between the two cases. As shown in the figure, there are four possible patterns of claim-making in the paired studies, each of which indicates a different driver of minority behavior. The first possibility is that the leaders of the two (ethnically

	Minority Claims between Groups: Same	Minority Claims between Groups: Different
Minority Claims over Time: Same	**Static similarities** (Cultural traits) 1	**Static differences** (History of ethnic relations) 2
Minority Claims over Time: Different	**Synchronized changes** (Impact of common lobby actor on host state) 3	**Unsynchronized changes** (Impact of different lobby actors on host states) 4

Figure 2.7 Model of joint comparative-longitudinal analysis

similar) groups make similar demands, despite differing conditions at the substate level. These claims also do not change significantly over time, in spite of changes in the international and domestic environment. Such findings would tend to confirm primordialist arguments that claim-making is driven by relatively static cultural or national traits that the two groups have in common.

The second possibility is that the leaders of the two minorities make different demands that do not change substantially over time. This would lend support to path-dependency arguments that the particular legacy of relations between the minority and majority at the substate level largely determines the goals that minority leaders will seek.

The third possibility is that the leaders of the two groups vary their demands synchronically over time. This would suggest that minority behavior is driven by *dynamic* features that the two groups have in common—their shared lobby actor (if they reside in different states but have the same lobby actor) or their shared host government (if they reside in the same state but have different lobby actors).

The final possibility is that the leaders of the two groups vary their demands *non*synchronically over time. This would indicate that minority claims are driven by dynamic features that the groups do *not* have in common, such as the actions of their different lobby actors (if the groups reside in the same state but have different lobby actors) or the actions of their different host governments (if they reside in different states but have the same lobby actor).

I apply this analytical framework to three paired case studies in postcommunist Europe to isolate the impact of host state and lobby actor behavior on minority mobilization: the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia (same lobby actor, different host governments), the Vojvodinian Hungarians and Kosovar Albanians in Yugoslavia (same host government, different lobby actors), and the Slovaks and Moravians in Czechoslovakia (same host government, no lobby actors). By analyzing these pairs over time and across space, I test the relative explanatory value of ethnic bargaining against competing accounts of claim-making.

This chapter uses a simple game tree model to illustrate the logic of ethnic bargaining: that minority radicalization is driven by signals of behavioral intent from the host government and/or lobby actor. The minority rank and file use these signals to update their beliefs concerning the other players' intentions toward the minority and thus the prevailing state of the world. Based on these beliefs, they will either radicalize against or accommodate the state center. Because they are continually updating their beliefs concerning the probable state of the world, minorities can be expected to mobilize periodically over time.

This model yields the surprising prediction that, if minority members are reasonably confident of external support, their leaders will radicalize for concessions despite the majority's best attempts to appease them. This stands in contrast to credible commitment expectations that minority radicalization is mainly a function of the center's inability to commit to minority protection. A spatial model is then introduced to illustrate how shifts in ethnic salience affect political coalitioning in multi-ethnic democracies. These micro-level processes are, in turn, embedded in a larger discursive structure that informs the prevailing modes and practices of ethnic bargaining used by minorities to challenge their governments the world over.